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and Risk Allocation into Patent Licensing Law
CHRISTIAN CHADD TAYLOR*
[A]Imost any contract problem can be solved as a tort problem by asking
what sanction is necessary to prevent the performing or paying party from
engaging in socially wasteful conduct, such as taking advantage of the
vulnerability of a party who performs his side of the bargain first.'
We should repair this gap between outmoded theory and market reality?
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the Department of Justice supported legislation in the United States
Senate that would have allowed patent licensors to include in licenses a
provision that would authorize the licensor to terminate the license if the
licensee challenged the validity of the patent.3 This "no-challenge termination
clause" was later introduced in the House of Representatives.4
Licensors supported the provision, reasoning that existing licensing laws
were a disincentive to innovation, for they increased the licensor's risk of
litigation by allowing a licensee to challenge the patent's validity without
incurring contractual obligations.5 Licensees also supported the provision,
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1991, Rose-
Hulman Institute of Technology. Special thanks to Karen S. Howe, John A. Crook, and Fred H. Cate
for their very helpful assistance with this Note. I would also like to thank the faculty and administration
of Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology for their continued support.
1. RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 253 (1992).
2. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that
one who assigns the rights to a patent or patent application cannot later contend that what was assigned
was invalid) (Newman, J., concurring and commenting on the "theory" of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653 (1969), the celebrated case which struck down the doctrine of licensee estoppel and thereby
threatened the enforceability of no-challenge termination clauses).
3. Senator Strom Thurmond proposed Senate Bill 2525, an amendment to the Clayton Antitrust
Act. The bill provided that:
Any patent license agreement may provide for a party or parties to the agreement to terminate
the license if the licensee asserts in a judicial action the invalidity of the licensed patent, and,
if the licensee has such a right to terminate, the agreement may further provide that the
licensee's obligations under the agreement shall continue until a final and unappealable
determination of invalidity is reached or until [the license is terminated]. Such agreement shall
not be unenforceable as to such provisions on the grounds that such provisions are contrary to
the Federal patent law or policy.
S. 2525, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
This type of provision is hereinafter referred to in this Note as a "no-challenge termination clause."
Such a clause should be distinguished from a "no-challenge clause," which is a provision that
completely bars the licensee from challenging the validity of the patent.
4. H.R. 4808, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
5. These hearings were never reported, William C. Rooklidge, Licensee Validity Challenges and
the Obligation to Pay Accrued Royalties: Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), 69 J. PAT [& TRADEMARK]
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arguing that existing laws discouraged licensing and increased royalty
payments due to the licensor's increased risk of litigation. Both groups
believed that they were competent to negotiate for no-challenge termination
clauses, and should possess the contractual freedom to do so.'
The Department of Justice' contended that, without giving the licensor
some leverage through devices such as no-challenge termination clauses,
"potential infringers are encouraged to enter into bad faith negotiations for a
license when their clear intention is simply to challenge the validity of the
patent."9 Nonetheless, the bill died in both houses.'0
OFF. Soc'Y 5, 25 (1987), but one commentator gives an account of hearings on a similar but earlier
proposal. See John W. Schlicher, A Lear v. Adkins Allegory, 68 J. PAT [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y
427, 438-40 (1986); see also Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21-22, 73-74, 161-63, 177-81 (1984) [hereinafter Patent Law Improvements Act].
6. See Schlicher, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. The Department of Justice took an active role in the area of patent licensing and patent antitrust
for over two decades prior to the Bush Administration. The Department under Bush, though, was silent
on these issues. Donald J. Baker & Richard H. Sayler, U.S. Justice Department Patent-Antitrust Policy:
The Hazards of Changing Policies and Distant Horizons, reprinted in 339 PRAC. L. INST. PATS.,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, INTELL.
PROP./ANTrrhUT 105, 118-20 (1993) [hereinafter 339 PRAC. L. INST.] For a discussion of the Bush
Administration's general disregard of innovation policy, see Michael Zielenziger, Execs Give Bush
Officials an Earful, Government Hasn't Supported High-Tech Policy, They Charge, SAN JOSE MERC.
NEwS, Oct. 16, 1992, at IF.
9. Hearings on H.R. 557 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies of the Commercial Law Comm. on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Monopolies] (statement of Roger B. Andewelt,
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div.), reprinted in 339 PRAC. L. INST., supra note 8, at 471,477-
78. The Department of Justice added that "these incentives distort the negotiating process and discourage
the efficient licensing of patents." Id. at 477.
10. Rooklidge, supra note 5, at 25. This was not the first time Congress considered this type of
provision. Numerous bills have been introduced in the past 24 years that would have modified the
validity challenge rights of parties to a license agreement. The following provisions were parts of much
broader bills, and thus the fact that they died in Congress should not necessarily bear on Congress'
intent towards the enforceability of no-challenge termination clauses.
S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) and H.R. 11868, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) provided that:
(2) The licensor shall, with respect to such patent or to such claim of such patent, have
the option of terminating such arrangement: Provided, however, that if any such
arrangement is so terminated with respect to less than all of the patents or claims so
licensed, and the arrangement itself does not provide for, or the parties thereto are unable,
within such time as the court may determine to be reasonable, to agree upon the
consideration to be paid for the license under the remaining patents or claims, the court
in which the invalidity is asserted shall determine a reasonable consideration to be paid
for the patents or claims not terminated.
S. 2255, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) provided that:
(a) Any licensee may at any time except after his arbitration with the patent owner and
a holding of validity of the patent pursuant to section 294 of this title assert the invalidity
of a patent in whole or in part, subject to the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) The licensee may assert the invalidity of the patent, in whole or in part, in any
action to which he is a party or by sending a written notice to the patentee pursuant to
this paragraph. Such notice shall specify with particularity the grounds for invalidity then
known to the licensee, and contain a statement that the licensee believes for such reasons
he is not obligated to pay royalty to the patentee under the license, or otherwise perform
thereunder.
(2) Upon service of such notice the licensee may-
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The legality of no-challenge termination clauses in patent licenses remains
uncertain," but the necessity of giving licensors the power to negotiate such
clauses is more evident in the 1990's than ever. The United States has entered
into global competition with the newly integrated European Economic
Community ("EEC") and with the Pacific Basin nations. 2 This global
competition is largely due to shifts in technology and process innovation
(A) suspend payment of royalty to the patentee, or any other performance to which the
patentee is legally entitled under the license; or
(B) bring a declaratory judgment action (pursuant to title 28, United States Code, chapter
151) against the patentee, to secure a declaration that the patent is invalid; or
(C) both.
(3)(A) The patentee may, within sixty days of his receipt of such written notice, or of the
assertion by the licensee of invalidity in litigation, elect to terminate the license. The
patentee may not thereafter terminate the license except on grounds other than the action
of the licensee taken pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(B) If the patentee elects so to terminate, then after the date of termination the licensee
shall not be liable to the patentee, under the license, and the licensee shall be liable to the
patentee, if at all, only for infringement of the patent, pursuant to this part of the title.
S. 1535, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 10 (1983) provided that:
A licensee shall not be estopped from asserting in judicial action the invalidity of any
patent to which it is licensed. Any agreement between the parties to a patent license
agreement which purports to bar the licensee from asserting the invalidity of any licensed
patent shall be unenforceable as to that provision.
... In the event of an assertion of invalidity by the licensee in a judicial action, licensee
and licensor shall each have the right to terminate the license at any time after such
assertion. Until so terminated by either party, the licensee shall pay and the licensor shall
receive the consideration set in the license agreement.
H.R. 3776, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. tit. II (1985) was identical to H.R. 4808, supra note 4.
11. Though some commentators believe that such clauses are legitimate, see, e.g., Thomas A.
Dieterich, Interface Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, reprinted in 339 PRAc. L. INST.,
supra note 8, at 9, 49 ("[T]he better rule is that a licensor can terminate a license if a licensee contests
validity of a licensed patent. A patent license should provide specifically that licensor can terminate if
licensee contests validity. Absent such a provision the licensor may have no right to terminate if the
licensee contests validity."); Tipton D. Jennings IV & Carrol L. Bryan II, The Ever Expansive Scope
ofLear v. Adkins: Does It Have Limits?, 59 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 679,704 (1977) ("[I]t
is clear that a licensee cannot be required to terminate or repudiate the license before bringing a
declaratory judgment action. Licensors, however, should expressly provide in the license agreement that
the license will be terminated upon a non-payment of royalties to leave open the possibility of suing the
licensee for infringement ... .'), the policies in Lear, discussed infra part I.A, have been adhered to
and expanded by most courts such that the enforceability of no-challenge termination clauses is dubious
in many jurisdictions. There are no cases, however, specifically addressing the validity of these clauses,
probably because most licensing attorneys have had no reason to believe, until the past six years or so,
that such a clause could be reconciled with the broad language in Lear. See William C. Rooklidge,
Licensee Validity Challenges and the Obligation to Pay Accrued Royalties: Lear v. Adkins Revisited
(Part II), 69 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'y 63, 89 (1987).
12. LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD, THE COMING ECONOMic BATTLE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE,
AND AMERICA 67-72 (1992); PAT CHOATE & J.K. LINGER, THE HIGH-FLEX SociETY 45 (1986).
The willingness of the United States to enter into the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") and its consideration of expanding free trade to South America is an indicator that global
competition is a reality and the United States is trying to maintain leverage. See Stuart Auerbach, U.S.,
Canada and Mexico Agree to Form Trade Bloc, Pact Would Create World's Largest Commercial Zone,
WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1992, at Al. Forming trade blocs, however, may be more an indicator of the
problem than a solution for it.
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rather than traditional factors such as wealth, capital availability, and natural
resources. 13
In order to stay competitive with these developing economic blocs, the
United States must innovate more and produce inventions more efficiently. 4
A new industrial growth policy is essential," but it must include more than
13. THuROW, supra note 12, at 39-51; CHOATE-& LINGER supra note 12, at 14-29.
Choate characterizes the role of technology in the global economy as the "Technology Wild Card."
He explains:
Technology is the wild card of the future. At an accelerating pace, it is creating dazzling
improvements in goods and services, generating millions of new jobs, revitalizing old
industries, and spawning entirely new ones. It is rendering established products and processes
obsolete, eliminating, millions of existing jobs, and radically transforming millions of others.
Technology is also inducing massive shifts in comparative advantage among industries,
firms, and nations, and in the process is giving a powerful competitive edge to those who can
apply advances best. Recognizing this unbreakable link between technology and economic
competitiveness, industries and nations today are caught up in a desperate race to create, apply,
and protect new technologies. If the United States is to maintain competitiveness and jobs, it
has no choice but to strengthen its scientific base and improve its capacity to commercialize,
deploy, and protect its innovations.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
14. Technology Policy and Competitiveness: The Federal Government's Role: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Government Information and Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992) [hereinafter Government's Role] (testimony of Marc Newkirk, President
and CEO, Lanxide); Technology Task Force, House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force]; Report on Technology Policy and its Effect on the
NationalEconomy (Comm. Print 1988). Lester Thurow, Dean of Massachusetts Institute of Technology's
Sloan School of Management and a professor of economics, emphasizes the "produce inventions more
efficiently" component to innovation. He points out that although the past leaders in economic growth
were those countries that could invent new products (the prime examples are the United States and Great
Britain during the industrial revolution through World War II), "in the twenty-first century sustainable
competitive advantage will come much more out of newprocess technologies and much less out of
newproduct technologies. Reverse engineering has become an art form. New products can easily be
reproduced." THuROw, supra note 12, at 45. Thurow points to the fact that although Americans invented
the video camera and recorder, and the fax, Japan has dominated the sales of these products because the
Japanese are better producers in these areas. Id. at 47. The United States still lags in this area. One
current example is the area of Smart Cards. Smart Cards are credit card-like plastic items that contain
a built-in microcomputer and memory chip. The p6tential of such devices is enormous, for one card
could act as a personal data base (containing emergency medical information, financial/budgeting
information, etc.), a bank account, an access card (to a door, automobile, computer, etc.), and myriad
other simultaneous applications. Though many of the patents on such inventions are American, the
Europeans lead in development and production. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, APPLICATIONS OF
COMPUTER CARD TECHNOLOGY (1989); Yvette DeBow, Credit/Debit Debuts in Midwest Smart Card
Test, V6 COMPUTERS IN BANKING 10 (1989); 'Smart Card' Adds Brains to Credit Card, L.A. TIMES,
May 26, 1992, at D2; William Raspberry, Saving the World With 'Smart Cards, WASH. POST, July 7,
1989, at A17.
This growing need to focus on process technology supports one of the themes of this Note, that the
law must encourage licensing arrangements while simultaneously making such arrangements more
efficient. This is true because licensing is in itself an efficient method of producing and distributing
technologies. See discussion, infra part I.B.2.
15. Though the Reagan and Bush administrations refused to form an industrial policy, the Clinton
Administration appears likely to form such a policy. See Bush'v. Clinton: Can Technology Revive the
Economy?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at M4 (Opinion Page); see also Katharine Seelye, In Their Own
Words, Clinton: What America Needs is Innovation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, at Fl. For the view that
the United States does not need an industrial policy, see MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990). For a critique of that work, see Dan Morgan, Think Locally, Win
Globally, Harvard's Porter Pushes Regional Clusters as the Key to Industrial Competitiveness, WASH.
POST, Apr. 5, 1992, at HI. See also Robert J. Samuelson, Do We Really Need a National Technology
Policy? Government Support Isn't the Answer, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1992, at A23.
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just increased research and development spending; the legal system must be
responsive as well. As one economist explains, "If the United States is to
maintain competitiveness and jobs, it has no choice but to strengthen its
scientific base and improve its capacity to commercialize, deploy, and protect
its innovations."' 6 Furthermore, small firms, start-up companies, and
individuals, who typically are undercapitalized licensors with fewer resources
and less bargaining power than many licensees, 7 are critical to the economy
and need legal protection.' 8 The law should take into account that these
small investors are becoming leaders" in our most critical technologies.2"
Because inventors take risks into account,2' it is important for them to
have the ability to reduce risk by allocating it between both the licensor and
the licensee.22 The EEC allocated this risk by specifically allowing
16. See CHOATE & LINGER, supra note 12, at 14.
17. See generally Alexander E. Silverman, Intellectual Property Law and the Venture Capital
Process, 5 HIGH TECH. L.L 157 (1990).
18. There is strong evidence that small firms are better innovators for two reasons: researchers in
these firms usually have more flexibility to take risks, and innovation typically is the best way for these
firms to enter into the market and be successful. See J. JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION
209,222,226 (2d ed. 1969); see also F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 416, 428 (2d ed. 1980); Panel Discussion, The Value of Patents and Other Legally
Protected Commercial Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.. 535, 537 (1984). Rochelle C. Dreyfus, in Dethroning
Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REv. 677 (1986), observes that:
[T]he "bold, risky departures from known teclology"... often have the greatest impact on
the quality of life.... [A]ny system aimed at stimulating invention should be designed in part
to encourage the small research firm.... [T]he design of the patent system should be uniquely
structured to suit the needs of small, non-integrated firms that can[not] profit from ...
investment costs during the time before others come into th market .... [I]t is especially
important to grant them exclusive rights to their inventions for a fixed period of years and to
allow them sufficient flexibility in their licensing arrangements to enable them to capture the
economic surplus that their inventions generate.
Id. at 728-29; see also Muriel Siebert, Hired Workers Get a Tax Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1983, at
A15 (pointing out that small businesses have produced up to 80% of all new jobs in recent years); Peter
G. Brown, Initial Conditions, Memorandum to President Bill Clinton, THE SCIENCES, JanJFeb. 1993,
at 2 (arguing that small ventures often create society's most beneficial breakthroughs because "the...
glory, precedence, creative thinking and intellectual stimulation make the game worth the candle.").
19. When International Business Machines announced on December 15, 1992, that it would cut
25,000 jobs in 1993 due to record losses, the New York Times ran an article the following day that
stated:
[S]ome technology experts say that I.B.M.'s decline may... mark the emergence of a new
model for computer and technology development in the United States that will become
powerful in its own right. Alliances of smaller, more innovative companies-sometimes
working with Government support and sometimes on their own-will come together quickly
to attack crucial problems.
John Markoff, Shifting Role in Technology, Smaller and Nimbler.Are Taking the Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1992, at Al, D4.
20. According to Lester Thurow, most commentators believe that there are seven "key industries"
of the next few decades, consisting of microelectronics, biotechnology, new materials industries, civilian
aviation, telecommunications, robots plus machine tools, and computer software. Thurow, supra note
12, at 45; see also Government's Role, supra note 14, at 3 (giving recognition to Thurow's "key
industry" statements).
21. See generally WILLIAM KINGSTON, INN OVATION, CREATIVrTY AND LAW (1989).
22. See generally Rooklidge, supra note 5; Dreyfus, supra note 18.
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no-challenge termination clauses.23 Germany favors the licensor even more
by allowing no-challenge clauses.24
The Supreme Court case of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins 25 and its progeny,2 6 are
the major obstacles to using no-challenge termination clauses in licenses.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,2' established in
23. STEVEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI, ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
24A-I 18-19 (1992).
24. Rooklidge, supra note 11, at 74 (citing F. BEIER ET AL., GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY,
COPYRIGHT AND ANTrrRUST LAWS 176-77 (1983)). The German statute provides that:
Agreements concerning the acquisition or use of patents, utility models, or protected seed
varieties shall be ineffective insofar as they impose upon the acquirer or licensee any
restrictions on his business conduct which go beyond the scope of the protected right.
... [S]ubsection (1) shall not apply to ... obligations of the acquirer or licensee not to
challenge the protected right.
Id. No-challenge clauses are discussed infra part II.A.
One commentator argues that United States patent/antitrust law in the area of licensing should model
itself after Europe's laws. Maria Sendra, Strategic Alliances for Innovation in the Global Market of the
1990's: A Comparative Study of the Relationship Between Innovation and the Patent/Antitrust
Mechanisms of the United States and the European Economic Community, 9 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW.
382 (1992). For another treatment of European principles in the patent/antitrust area, see David Perkins,
Foreign Principles oflntellectual Property/Antitrust: The EEC, reprinted in 339 PRAC. LAW INST., supra
note 8, at 279.
25. Lear, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (holding that licensees are not judicially estopped from challenging
the validity of a patent as a defense to an infringement action).
26. The progeny of cases expanding the holding of Lear is vast. Many of these cases have much
influence in an attorney's decision to use a no-challenge termination provision in a license. See generally
Precision Shooting Equip. Co. v. Allen, 646 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1964
(1981); Kaspar Wireworks, Inc. v. Lee Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978); St. Regis
Paper Co. v. Royal Indus., 552 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Kraly v.
National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1974); Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Moraine
Prods., 509 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1974); Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973); Business Forms Finishing Serv., Inc. v. Carson, 452 F.2d
70 (7th Cir. 1971); Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
911 (1970); Lee v. Lee Custom Eng'g Inc., 476 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Robintech, Inc. v.
Chemidus Wavin Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1978); Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc.,
401 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uniroyal, Inc. v. ACS Indus., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. 522 (N.D. Ga.
1975); Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 356 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Il1. 1973), modified on other grounds, 504
F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affd, 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975); Milton G. Waldbaum Co.
v. Roberts Dairy Co., 325 F. Supp. 772 (D. Neb. 1971); Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact
Lens Lab., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
27. See John W. Schlicher, Judicial Regulation ofPatent Licensing, Litigation and Settlement Under
Judicial Policies Created in Lear v. Adkins, 3 A. INTELL. PROP. L. A. SELECTED LEGAL PAPERS 1-13
(1985); see also Monopolies, supra note 9.
28. The Federal Circuit only considers cases from the Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (previously the Court of Customs Appeals) as binding authority. It
therefore has the ability to disregard the courts that have broadened Lear to the extent that it endangers
the validity of no-challenge termination clauses.
As to the important question of which law a court will follow in deciding the validity of no-challenge
termination provisions, the Federal Circuit generally applies the precedents of the appropriate regional
circuits in contract-related cases unless it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied
Theory Assocs., 772 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that state law was applicable in determining
the enforceability of a patent settlement agreement under the statute of frauds). This general rule
suggests that a district court could apply its regional circuit interpretation of Lear.
However, the Federal Circuit later held that it is obligated to set forth its own interpretation of the
effect of Lear on consent decree judgments. Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
The court spoke broadly, stating:
NO-CHALLENGE TERMINATION CLAUSES
1982 to hear patent cases (among others), however, has taken an approach
more amenable to patentees, reversing much of the case law decided in the
wake of Lear.29
This Note argues that the state of the law under Lear and its progeny
effectively eliminated the licensee's risk by shifting it to the licensor,3 ° and
that the Federal Circuit takes an approach more in line with the licensor's
needs. Part I of this Note discusses the effect of Lear on the validity of no-
challenge termination provisions. Part II reviews the progeny of cases that
broadened the Lear holding. Part III discusses several Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals decisions which have limited Lear and its progeny, thereby
opening the door for the validation of no-challenge termination clauses.
I. LEAR AND ITS EFFECT ON No-CHALLENGE TERMINATION CLAUSES
No-challenge termination clauses would be legally enforceable if the
Supreme Court had not held in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins that licensees cannot be
estopped from challenging the validity of their licensed patents. Because the
Court did not determine who may not estop the licensees and how they may
not be estopped, no-challenge termination clauses could be viewed as falling
within the Lear restriction. Such an interpretation of the case, however, would
be a misreading of Lear and would place excessive risk on potential licensors.
A. The Case of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins
In Lear, Adkins developed an inexpensive way to improve the accuracy of
gyroscopes. At the same time, Lear, Inc. manufactured gyroscopes. 3' In
1954, Adkins applied for patent protection of his improvements and then
entered into license negotiations with Lear in 1955.32 The resulting license
stipulated that Lear could use Adkins' inventions in exchange for royalties on
A district court must, of course, follow Federal Circuit precedent in a case arising under the
patent laws .... We perceive a clear need for uniformity and certainty in the interpretation
of Lear as applied to a consent decree holding a patent valid and infringed .... If regional
circuit interpretations of Lear's applicability to resjudicata applied in a suit arising under the
patent laws, a split would instantaneously result and forum shopping for resolution of that issue
would be encouraged.
Id. at 475.
Therefore, although the Federal Circuit could decide that because a no-challenge termination clause
is contractual in nature it falls under the general rule of using the regional circuit court precedent, Foster
suggests that the Federal Circuit's interpretations of Lear would be binding upon the district courts.
29. See generally Foster, 947 F.2d 469 (holding that a consent judgment can preclude validity
challenges); Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (indicating that settlement
agreements that preclude validity challenges are enforceable); Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc.,
848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 (1988); Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
780 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716
F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1983); infra part III.
30. See discussion infra notes 131-95 and accompanying text.
31. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 435 P.2d 321 (1967), vacated, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Gyroscopes are
instruments used in aircraft for direction and altitude information.
32. Jennings & Bryan, supra note 11.
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net sales of Lear's products.33 The agreement allowed Lear, the licensee, to
terminate the license agreement if Adkins' patent application was unsuccessful
or if a court declared the patent invalid.34 In the meantime, Lear experiment-
ed with other methods of achieving gyroscope accuracy, 35 probably taking
advantage of the information on Adkins' invention it received through the
license negotiations.36
Lear began withholding royalties in 1957 after the Patent Office rejected
Adkins' application. 37 Lear terminated the agreement in 1959 after a second
rejection. 38 Adkins' patent was'granted in 1960. He then sued Lear for
royalty payments and Lear defended on the basis that the patent was
invalid. 39 The California Supreme Court held for Adkins, the licensor,
invoking the so-called doctrine of "licensee estoppel." The court defined the
doctrine in the following way:
[O]ne of the oldest doctrines in the field of patent law establishes that so
long as a licensee is operating under a license agreement he is estopped to
deny the validity of his licensor's patent in a suit for royalties under the
agreement. The theory underlying this doctrine is that a licensee should not
be permitted to enjoy the benefit afforded by the agreement while
simultaneously urging that the patent which forms the basis of the
agreement is void ......
"Under the doctrine of licensee estoppel, Lear would be prohibited from
challenging the validity of Adkins' patent if the agreement had not been
validly terminated."'" The California Supreme Court then found that Lear
had not terminated the agreement properly under the two termination
provisions.42
33. Adkins, 435 P.2d at 324.
34. Id. at 329; see also Jennings & Bryan, supra note 11.
35. Adkins, 435 P.2d at 328.
36. Id.; Jennings & Bryan, supra note 11, at 680.
37. Adkins, 435 P.2d at 330 n. 11.
38. Id. at 330. It is not uncommon for patent applications to be rejected before they are finally
granted and thus such an occurrence should not necessarily be held against the licensor. As the
California Supreme Court explained:
The prosecution of the application before the United States Patent Office will, except in very
unusual cases, consist of at least one rejection of some or all of the claims of the application
on the ground that a search has indicated they have been anticipated by prior inventions, and
the subsequent amendment of the claims or specifications by the inventor .... He may then
file an amendment which will alter the prior claims, cancel them, or add new claims. . . . This
procedure of rejection and amendment is so commonplace that one authority has stated that
most patent attorneys view with some misgivings those rare instances in which an application
is allowed without amendment because it raises the possibility that the applicahit has failed to
state his claims as broadly as he could have and that a still broader claim might have been
allowed, defining the invention (and thus the protection afforded by the patent) in a manner
broader and more advantageous to the applicant.
Id. at 326 (citing ARTuR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACrITIONER SHOULD KNow ABoUT
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 60 (1st ed. 1956)).
39. Id. at 330-31.
40. Id. at 325-26 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 331.
42. Id. at 325.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed, invalidating the doctrine known
as licensee estoppel.43 Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, first cited case
law which upheld the doctrine," but concluded that the status of licensee
estoppel under these precedents was "uncertain,"45 because "the doctrine
[was] so eroded that it could no longer be considered the 'general rule,' but
was only to be invoked in an ever-narrowing set of circumstances."4 6 The
Court noted that it had previously carved out exceptions in the areas of fraud,
assignor estoppel, and price-fixing agreements.47
The most influential portion of Justice Harlan's opinion included a policy
analysis that presently stands as the major obstacle to using no-challenge
termination clauses. 48 The opinion stated that two policies were in conflict.
First, the law of contracts "forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises
simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain. 49 Second, it
was necessary to insure the validity of patents, so that unoriginal ideas could
remain in the public domain.
50
In resolving the conflict in favor of federal patent policy, the Court said
"the licensor's equities are far from compelling"'" for a patent only is a
"legal conclusion" of the Patent Office, reached without the aid of arguments
43. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
44. Id. at 663-68; see also Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950).
45. Lear, 395 U.S. at 668.
46. Id. at 664.
47. Id. at 664-66 (citing Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342
(1924) (holding that while an assignor may not directly attack the validity of a patent by reference to
the prior art, he could introduce such evidence to narrow the patent claims); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945) (holding that an assignor could not be estopped when he attempted to
show that he simply copied the invention from an expired patent); and Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec.
Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (holding that a licensee could contest the validity of the patent where the
licensor attempted to enforce price-fixing provisions)).
"Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents one who has assigned the rights to a patent
or patent application from later contending that what was assigned is a nullity." ROBERT L. HARMON,
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRcurr 217 (2d ed. 1991). An assignment is an actual transfer of title in
a patent, CHOATE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 680 (3d ed. 1989), while a license is a
contractual agreement between a patentee and one who is granted a right to make, use, or sell under the
patent. Id. at 692.
The doctrine of assignor estoppel was struck down in Scott Paper. The Lear Court analogized that
the failure of this doctrine indicated that licensee estoppel should likewise be invalidated. Assignor
estoppel was resurrected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Diamond
Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For analyses of this case, see Amber
L. Hatfield, Life After Death ofAssignor Estoppel: Per Se Application to Protect Incentives to Innovate,
68 TEX. L. REv. 251 (1989), and infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
48. See infra part II.
49. Lear, 395 U.S. at 668.
50. Specifically, the Court said:
On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises simply
because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has made. On the other hand, federal
law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they
are protected by a valid patent.
Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite




from parties who may be interested in showing invalidity.52 The Court
concluded that:
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are
balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free
competition in the uses of ideas which are in reality a part of the public
domain. Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic
incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they
are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to
would-be monopolists without need or justification. s3
Thus, the Court apparently banned the doctrine of licensee estoppel and in so
doing overturned Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc.5
4
The Court, however, was not finished. The second half of the opinion
indicated that the Court was willing to go to great lengths to protect the
licensee," because it was concerned that federal policies would be "signifi-
cantly frustrated if licensees could be required to continue to pay royalties
during the time they are challenging the patent validity in the courts," ' even
when the license expressly provides otherwise.
52. Id. The Court went on to say:
Consequently, it does not seem to us to be unfair to require a patentee to defend the Patent
Office's judgement when his licensee places the question in issue, especially since the
licensor's case is buttressed by the presumption of validity which attaches to his patent. Thus,
although licensee estoppel may be consistent with the letter of contractual doctrine, we cannot
say that it is compelled by the spirit of contract law, which seeks to balance the claims of
promisor and promisee in accord with the requirements of good faith.
Id.
53. Id.
54. Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950) (holding that a licensee could not challenge the
validity of the licensed patent) (citing United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905)).
55. Lear, 395 U.S. at 671-75.
56. Id. at 673. The Court's analysis was as follows:
Enforcing this contractual provision would give the licensor an additional economic incentive
to devise every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to postpone the day of final judicial
reckoning. We can perceive no reason to encourage dilatory court tactics in this way.
Moreover, the cost of prosecuting slow-moving trial proceedings and defending an inevitable
appeal might well deter many licensees from attempting to prove patent invalidity in the courts.
The deterrent effect would be particularly severe in the many scientific fields in which
invention is proceeding at a rapid rate. In these areas, a patent may well become obsolete long
before its 17-year term has expired. If a licensee has reason to believe that he will replace a
patented idea with a new one in the near future, he will have little in6entive to initiate lengthy
court proceedings, unless he is freed from liability at least from the time he refuses to pay the
contractual royalties. Lastly, enforcing this contractual provision would undermine the strong
federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain. For all these
reasons, we hold that Lear must be permitted to avoid the payment of all royalties accruing
after Adkins' 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent invalidity.
Id. at 673-74.
57. The license provisions stated that "'Lear shall have the right on ninety days' prior written notice
to Adkins, to terminate any one or more of the licenses herein granted"' and that .'[i]n the event that
... the U.S. Patent Office refuses to issue a patent on the substantial claims of the application attached
as Exhibit 'B', or if such a patent so issued is subsequently held invalid"' then Lear "'shall have the
right forthwith to terminate the specific license so affected or to terminate this entire Agreement and no
further royalties shall thereupon be payable under the license so terminated or under this Agreement if




In effect, the Lear case gave the licensee the power to negotiate for a
license, sue for invalidity so that he could release himself from royalty
obligations, and be free of such payments while the suit was in progress. This
power continued to shift from the licensor to the licensee for over a decade
through lower court decision-making. 8 These courts took Lear to its
extreme, barring virtually every means available for limiting validity
challenges by licensees.
B. The Limits to Lear
Two analytical flaws in Lear created confusion in the courts and in the field
of licensing regarding licensee estoppel, no-challenge clauses, and no-
challenge termination clauses. The opinion misinterprets the history of the
doctrine of "licensee estoppel" and omits a major constitutional policy of
patent law-encouraging innovation. Resolving these errors reveals that the
case's pronounced legal rule and policy analysis must be read narrowly. Such
a narrow interpretation of the case supports the validity of no-challenge
termination clauses.
1. The Limits to the Lear Holding and the Court's Error in
Analyzing the History of "Licensee Estoppel"
The Court's holding in Lear is vague. All that one can be sure of is that it
permits a licensee to challenge the validity of the licensed patent under certain
circumstances. The Court, however, did not specify these circumstances.
On its facts, the case only invalidated court-imposed estoppel. There was
no license provision agreed upon by which a licensee would not be allowed
to challenge the patent's validity (no-challenge clause). Nor was there a no-
challenge termination clause. Nor was there any discussion concerning
interests in contractual freedom other than the Court's recognition that state
law exclusively governs contract issues.59
The limits of the Lear holding run deeper than just narrowing it to court-
imposed estoppel. If the Court had understood the historical meaning of the
term it loosely defined as "licensee estoppel," it might not have used such
sweeping language. Traditionally, three types of estoppel exist: estoppel by
deed, estoppel by record, and equitable estoppel." Estoppel by deed and by
record prevent a party to an instrument stating a fact from denying that fact,
58. See infra part H.
59. Lear, 395 U.S. at 661-62; see also William C. Rooklidge, Licensee Validity Challenges and the
Obligation to Pay Accrued Royalties: Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), 68 J. PAT [& TRADEMARK]
Soc'y 506, 537 n.166 (1986) ("[B]ecause Lear did not involve a no-challenge clause, it should also be
evident that the Court did not strike down the basic contract principle that a licensor should be bound
by his express promise not to challenge the validity of his licensor's patent."). Because a no-challenge
clause is much more restrictive than a no-challenge termination clause, it would seem the latter would
be more appropriately governed by contract principles.
60. For a more in-depth discussion of the history of licensee estoppel and the misunderstandings
of the Lear Court, see Rooklidge, supra note 59, at 537 n.166.
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while equitable estoppel (estoppel in pais) prevents a party from contesting
the validity of her conduct that another party relied upon.61 Licensee estoppel
doctrine developed in England in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The
doctrine was based somewhat upon estoppel by deed, but was entirely separate
from equitable estoppel. 62 The doctrine was derived from landlord-tenant
law, which prohibited tenants from challenging the validity of the landlord's
title as a defense to a suit for rent, based on the fact that the landlord's title
was not relevant to the withholding of rent payments.63
Likewise, the validity of a licensed patent was irrelevant to withholding
royalty payments.64 In landlord-tenant law, title was irrelevant unless the
tenant was evicted or there was fraud involved.6 ' Thus, if a licensee was
"evicted" from its licensing rights or if there was fraud involved on the
licensor's part, the validity of the patent then became relevant.66 Further-
more, the tenant could defend on the basis of invalidity once he terminated
or repudiated the lease.67 This rule was adopted in the United States by the
middle of the nineteenth century. 6 The American courts mistakenly catego-
rized the rule in terms of estoppel. 69 That error ultimately confused the Lear
majority.7°
This historical perspective explains the Court's willingness to accept the
doctrine of "licensee estoppel" in some situations but not others. In Automatic
Radio the licensee did not terminate or repudiate the license agreement and
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 551, 1275 (abridged 6th ed. 1991) defines the terms as follows:
Estoppel by deed. A grantor in a warranty deed who does not have title at the time of the
conveyance but who subsequently acquires title is estopped from denying that he had title at
time of the transfer and such after-acquired title insures to the benefit of the grantee or his
successors.
Estoppel in pals. The doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or
silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.
Record, estoppel by. An "estoppel by record" is the preclusion to deny the truth of a matter
set forth in a record, whether judicial or legislative, also to deny the facts adjudicated by a
court of competent-jurisdiction.
62. See Rooklidge, supra note 59, at 509.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 509-11.
65. Id.
66. Id. An example of eviction in a patent license is where a patent is held invalid in a suit not
involving the licensee. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253, 1255 (6th Cir. 1972).
67. Rooklidge, supra note 59, at 509-1.
68. Wilder v. Adams, 29 F. Cas. 1216 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 17,647), applied the English rule
in deciding that the licensee cannot challenge the validity of the patent when the licensor sues for
accrued royalties.
69. See Rooklidge, supra note 59, at 512.
70. The majority attributed the "uncertain state" of the licensee estoppel doctrine to judicial efforts
"to accommodate the competing demands of the common law of contracts and the federal law of
patents." Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969). The Court explained that:
On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises simply
because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has made. On the other hand, federal
law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they
are protected by a valid patent.
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there was no fraud involved, so estoppel applied.71 On the other hand, the
Court, in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.,72 did not apply
the doctrine because fraud was a factor, just as would have been the case in
the parallel landlord-tenant form of validity challenge doctrine.73 The Lear
Court, despite its broad language, reached the correct result only because
Lear, the licensee, terminated the license.74
If the majority had correctly analyzed the history of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel, a large portion of the Court's reasoning would likely have been
omitted and the true form of the doctrine which properly preserved the
balance of power between the licensor and the licensee would have remained
legally intact. No-challenge termination clauses would have been enforceable
under this scenario. Unfortunately, the Lear Court assumed that there was "a
chaos of conflicting case law" 75 so it took an all-or-nothing approach,
excessively shifting power to the licensee. This shift enabled the licensee to
use information concerning the invention to develop its own inventions,76 sue
the inventor, and profit from the invention without paying royalties. The Court
compounded this error, however, with an even more fundamental mistake-it
forgot to include in its reasoning the most important justification for the
existence of American patent law-encouraging innovation.
2. The Neglected Patent Policy
The Lear majority excluded from its opinion major constitutional policies
that would have made the Court's dicta more amenable to no-challenge
termination clauses. The most important of these is the need for patent law to
encourage innovation. The Court, however, now explicitly recognizes these
policies. 77 Such recognition supports the case for enforcing no-challenge
termination clauses because these clauses encourage people to invent and to
license their inventions.
Lear advocated the policy of keeping "all ideas in general circulation...
unless they are protected by a valid patent."78 However, the Court neglected
two other major patent policies derived from the United States Constitu-
tion:79 encouraging innovation and promoting disclosure of inventions to the
71. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
72. Scott Paper, 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
73. Id. In addition, this was an assignor estoppel case. See supra note 47.
74. Lear, 395 U.S. 653.
75. Id. at 668.
76. This is in fact what likely happened in the Lear case. See Jennings & Bryan, supra note 11;
supra text accompanying note 36.
77. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohrn & Haas, Co., 448 U.S. 176, 220-22 (1980).
78. Lear, 395 U.S. at 668. Unlike the neglected patent policies, this policy is not directly derived
from the Constitution. See J. Thomas McCarthy, "Unmuzzling" the Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake
of Lear v. Adkins, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 434 (1977).
79. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 reads: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
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public."0 In fact, the Court declared in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm &
Haas that "the policy of stimulating invention that underlies the entire patent
system runs no less deep" than the policy of free competition."'
Innovation policy was not as important to courts prior to and immediately
following the Lear decision. America clearly led the world in manufacturing
and innovation during the middle part of the twentieth century.82 Economists
argued that Western Europe was economically healthy, but not a threat to
American economic power.83 Japan had the seemingly impossible task of
recovering from a lost war and the devastation of two atomic bombs. The
United States' economic status seemed not only unmatchable, but also beyond
exterior influence.
During the past two decades, though, the international economic environ-
ment has changed. The United States lost market share in *some of its
strongest industries.84 Information technology linked the world and reduced
costs to foreign business.8 5 Japan took advantage of new technology and
began to catch up with the United States in producing new technologies. By
the mid-1980's Japan dominated the global market in personal radios and
cassette players, black and white T.V.'s, VCR's, and CD players.86 The
Japanese owned almost a one-third market share of the automobile industry
80. See Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 222; Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262
(1979) ("The purposes of the federal patent system [are] [f]irst to foster and reward invention; second,
[to] promote disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice
the invention once the patent expires; third.... to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there
for the free use of the public."); Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1974) ("The
decision of Congress to adopt a patent system was based on the idea that there will be much more
innovation if discoveries are disclosed and patented than there will be when everyone works in secret.
Society thus fosters a free exchange of technological information at the cost of a limited 17-year
monopoly."); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964) ("The patent system
is one in which uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time
preserving free competition.'); see also Rooklidge, supra note 5, at 16. The policy of promoting
disclosure of inventions to the public is congruent with encouraging invention; more innovation
eventually results in more disclosure after the monopoly term ends. Encouraging disclosure was a policy
noted in the celebrated case of Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
Since the Lear case, the Court has explicitly recognized the economic benefits that flow from patents
and the agreements to exploit them. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980), vacated,
444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
81. Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 221.
82. THUROW, supra note 12, at 16-17.
83. Id.
84. Government's Role, supra note 14, at 40-49 (statement of Dr. Julie Fox Gorte, Senior Associate,
Office of Technology Assessment); id. at 70 (testimony of Erich Bloch, Distinguished Fellow, Council
on Competitiveness); Task Force, supra note 14, at 7, 26-27; CHOATE & LINGER, supra note 12, at 3-4.
Choate gives several examples, including "advanced computers, semiconductors, aircraft, machine tools,
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, industrial chemicals, engines, turbines,
plastics, steel, automobiles, synthetics, insurance, engineering services, banking, and many others." Id.
85. CHOATE & LINGER, supra note 12, at 15.
86. Id. at 4; see also Task Force, supra note 14, at 26-27, 40.
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in 1991.87 From 1979 to 1989, that country's industrial growth rate was
nearly twice that of the United States.88 In Europe, the twelve states
comprising the EEC opened their markets to each other on January 1, 1993."
The aggregate GNP of the EEC, led by a unified Germany with a heavily
increased labor force, is larger than that of the United States.9" The
dismantling of the U.S.S.R. and the introduction of capitalism in Eastern
Europe transformed the EEC into a trading block that is becoming less
dependent on the United States militarily and economically, increasing the
chances that it will be more bold in protecting its industries.9'
These developments mean that the United States no longer dominates the
markets and will encounter more economic competition through the turn of the
century.9" Virtually all experts agree that innovation is one of the keys, if
America is to remain competitive.93 In light of the U.S. economic domination
at the time, the Lear majority probably did not feel compelled to encourage
87. THUROW, supra note 12, at 114.
88. Id. at 72.
89. Although the markets have been opened, the Community still faces numerous obstacles in
attaining complete integration.
90. THUROW, supra note 12, at 62.
91. See, e.g., Michael Amdt, "Soybean War" Mushrooming into Global Trade Crisis: U.S.
Threatens Europe with Taxes, CRm. TRB., Oct. 27, 1992, § 3, at 1.
92. Task Force, supra note 14, at 36-41. The competition becomes more evident every year. For
instance, Japan's trade surplus with the United States rose 14% in 1992 to $43.67 billion. Andrew
Pollack, Japanese Trade Surplus Leaps to a Record, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at L37.
93. Government's Role, supra note 14, at 74 (statement of General Motors Corp.); Congressional
Research Service for the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1992); Technology and Economic Perfornance: Hearing Before
the Joint Economic Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1992) (statement of Admiral B.R. Inman,
Chairman, Carnegie Commission Task Force on Science, Technology and Economic Performance,
Science Applications International Corporation); Task Force, supra note 14, at 10-20; Trade and
Technology Promotion Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 10 1st Cong.,
2d Sess. 7-8 (1990) (statement of Senator Roth); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 102 CONG., IST
SESS., TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FROM PUBLICLY FUNDED RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS TO THE PRIVATE
SECTOR 3-4 (Comm. Print 1991); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE
AND LOCAL INITIATIVES ON PRODUCTIVITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION: ENHANCING A NATIONAL
RESOURCE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 2-3 (1990); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS
4-11 (1992); see also COUNCIL OF COMPETITIvENESS, PICKING UP THE PACE: THE COMMERCIAL
CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN INNOVATION (1988); DON E. KASH, PERPETUAL INNOVATION: THE NEW
WORLD OF COMPETITION (1989). It seems that even many non-experts agree with this position. See, e.g.,
Mary Jo Waits, Game Plan for a Competitive World, The States Are Worried About Being Left in the
Dust of a 'Globalized' Economy. But Many, Including Arizona, Are Doing Something About It. The
Challenge: Help for Industry, ARIz. REPUB., Feb. 9, 1992, at CI; Ronald E. Yates, In Global Race to
Compete, U.S. Not the Swiftest, CHI. TRiB., June 14, 1992, § 1, at 1.
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innovation.94 Now, however, the once neglected constitutional policy of
encouraging innovation is more applicable than ever.95
C. The Effect of Lear on No-Challenge Termination Clauses
An example of a no-challenge termination clause might be similar to the
following provision: "[LICENSOR] retains the right to terminate this
agreement if [LICENSEE] asserts in any judicial proceeding or document,
during the lifetime of this agreement, that said patents are invalid. 916 The
94. Another explanation for the Lear Court's neglect of incentives to innovate is that it was greatly
concerned with monopolization. See Dreyfus, supra note 18, at 724-25 ("IT]he Lear Court framed the
licensee estoppel issue as a choice between two competing goals, research promotion and widespread
use ('public access'). Writing in an antipatent, antimonopoly milieu and taking a static view of the
interests that favor immediate access to existing innovations, the Court ignored the need to create rules
that stimulate fiture innovation.") (citing Arnold & Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEX. L. REv. 1235
(1970)).
Donald I. Baker and Richard H. Sayler elaborated on these shifts in patent approach in the Federal
Government and federal court system. Baker & Sayler, supra note 8, at 109, 112-34. They divide patent
antitrust approaches into two groups: populism and efficiency. Id. at 112. Judge Learned Hand expressed
the "populism" approach in the following statement:
[Congress] was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because of
its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his
success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged
must accept the direction of a few.
Id. at 112-13 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945)). The
"economic efficiency" approach focuses on market performance, costs, and economic efficiencies. Id.
at 113. The populism approach was more prevalent during the Lear era. Today, the economic efficiency
approach dominates the courts and the Federal Government's line of thought, although the new Clinton
Administration's approach is still uncertain. During the populism era, patents were assumed to be
monopolies and thus were under great suspicion. The ex parte nature of the Patent and Trademark
Office's patent examinations made the courts even more skeptical. Now, the economic efficiency
approach seems to be leaning toward less restrictive views of patent validity. See, e.g., infra notes 249-
50 and accompanying text. The Department of Justice summarized this view in 1986:
The courts, including the United States Supreme Court, continue to make statements that reflect
a mistaken view that intellectual property protection is antithetical, and really an exception, to
principles of competition. These statements fare poorly under close scrutiny.
I would like to turn to the relationship between patent law and antitrust law. Contrary to
popular opinion the two do not conflict.
... Patents, like other regimes of intellectual property, really are not evil monopolies; they
simply create property rights. Property rights, in turn, are the cornerstone of an efficient free-
market economy. They create the incentive for private investment in productive activity by
providing the investor with the means to appropriate the returns from his efforts free from
undue interference by third parties.
The Antitrust Implications of International Licensing: After the Nine No-No's, Remarks of Charles F.
Rule, Deputy AssistantAttorney GeneralAntitrust Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, Before the Legal
Conference Sponsored by the World Trade Association and the Cincinnati Patent Law Association, Oct.
21, 1986, reprinted in 339 PRAc. L. INST., supra note 8, at 450-54.
95. Several articles discuss and criticize Lear, including Arnold & Goldstein, supra note 94; L.B.
Dodds, After Lear v. Adkins-72at?, 51 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 621 (1969); Jennings &
Bryan, supra note 11; McCarthy, supra note 78; Richard H. Stem, Antitrust Implications of Lear v.
Adkins, 52 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 213 (1970).
96. See also HARRY R. MAYERS, DRAFriNG PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 119-20 (1984).
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preceding analysis of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins97 yields five reasons why the case
should not bar a no-challenge termination clause today.
First, the Lear Court did not rule on the validity of such a clause. Nor did
it rule on no-challenge clauses.9" The holding states that a court may not
keep a licensee from challenging the validity of a patent through judicially-
imposed estoppel. Despite the Court's sweeping language, it never said that
a licensee could not bar himself from challenging a patent's validity through
a contract. 99 Furthermore, when reconciled with the historically accurate idea
of "licensee estoppel," the case would have at most only invalidated no-
challenge termination provisions in certain cases such as fraud and antitrust
violations."' 0
Even if we understand the Court's decision to mean that a licensee can
challenge patent validity in every circumstance, no-challenge termination
clauses would not violate such a rule. This type of contractual provision does
not bar a licensee from challenging the patent's validity. It merely gives the
licensor the right to terminate the license in such a case, enabling the licensor
to sue the licensee for infringement.' If the licensee has a good case for
patent invalidity, then he risks little from termination.
Second, the fact that the Court avoided contractual issues lends support to
the validity of no-challenge termination clauses. The Court stated:
Since the California Supreme Court's construction of the 1955 licensing
agreement is solely a matter of state law, the only issue open to us is
raised by the court's reliance upon the doctrine of estoppel to bar Lear
from proving that Adkin's ideas were dedicated to the common welfare by
federal law. 2
No-challenge termination clauses are contractual in nature-for the conse-
quence of enforcing such a provision is license termination.' 3 Federal
courts should avoid interfering with contracts which are reasonable' and
97. Lear, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
98. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 31-58 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
101. The licensor may not be able to sue licensees for infringement otherwise, since patent licenses
guarantee that the patentee's right of excluding anyone from making, using, or selling the invention does
not apply to licensees. CHOATE, supra note 47.
102. Lear, at 661-62.
103. This is the key difference in analyzing the enforceability of no-challenge clauses and no-
challenge termination clauses. No-challenge clauses are somewhat contractual in nature, but the
consequence of using such a provision, namely the barring of judicial action, is non-contractual. The
patent law casebook of CHOATE, supra note 47, explains that "[l]icenses are contractual arrangements
between a patentee and one who is granted a right to make, use, or sell under the patent. The rules
governing license formation, enforcement, and termination are not provided by the patent statutes. They
are instead a product of general contract law." Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
104. In the area of patent antitrust, the Department of Justice under President Ronald Reagan argued
that broad antitrust prohibitions should be avoided because they could impede innovation. Instead, it
contended that a "rule of reason" approach would be better. Such an approach is used in general
antitrust law. It employs a case-by-case analysis to strike down only those practices whose anti- .
competitive effects outweigh their pro-competitive effects. See 339 PRAc. L. INST., supra note 8, at 642-
43. Rooklidge argues that the rule of reason should be used to evaluate no-challenge clauses. See
Rooklidge, supra note 5, at 89-90. Such an analysis of no-challenge termination clauses similarly is
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competently agreed upon, for many licensees are likely to be experienced in
contract law and to know about the risks involved in making such contracts.
Third, no-challenge termination clauses foster constitutional policies. It
seems reasonable to believe, as the Lear Court did, that some critical federal
policies outweigh contractual freedoms. 10 5 But in the case of no-challenge
termination clauses, contractual freedom buttresses federal policy. In today's
global economy, the United States must innovate more and produce inventions
more efficiently.1 6 The Supreme Court recently emphasized the importance
of this policy."0 7 No-challenge termination clauses foster this goal in two
ways.0 8 No-challenge termination clauses encourage the inventor to
appropriate. Clauses that are fraudulent or violate antitrust laws could be struck down, while those
provisions that increase innovation and innovative efficiency would be upheld.
Courts tend to reject challenges to innovation of monopolists under the rule of reason. See, e.g.,
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodk Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 872 (1975); cf Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992) (allowing an airline some leverage over competitors because of a
computerized reservation system).
105. Dreyfus, in Dethroning Lear, Dreyfus supra note 18, points out that "[b]ecause there are no
standards by which to judge whose interest is more weighty, it is more fruitful to focus on the rewards
the system offers patentees and to ask whether providing them with a particular reward.., is likely to
be such an effective stimulant to innovation that its social cost is justified." Id. at 725 (citing Louis
Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1815, 1821-22 (1984) and
Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual
Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 503,312 (1984)). This Note contends that the Lear Court failed to include
innovation interests on the scales, and that providing licensors with the ability to negotiate no-challenge
termination clauses is "an effective stimulant to innovation" in which the "social cost" of allowing a few
invalid patents to exist "is justified."
.106. See Task Force, supra note 14; see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953), aftd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (discussing the process of innovation as
plainly permitted by the antitrust laws as conduct which a competitive society must foster); S. REP. No.
427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984) ("[T]he international competitiveness of U.S. firms ... depends
on their ability to remain at the frontiers of technological development."); Antitrust Division View of
1984: Remarks of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ch. 13,130 (Apr. 15, 1984) ("[I]t is difficult to overstate the importance of technological advance
to this country's economic welfare.').
One author emphasizes the role that law must take toward economic efficiency in view of history:
As throughout history, many resources are closer to common property than exclusively owned.
... The best that societies have ever accomplished is to raise the private return close enough
to the social return to provide sufficient incentives to achieve economic growth.... [N]ot only
has technological progress been slow throughout most of history, but diminishing returns to
the stock of natural resources has been the most critical economic dilemma of mankind.
... The widespread tendency of states to produce inefficient property rights and hence fail to
achieve sustained growth; and the inherent instability of all states ... leads to economic
change and ultimately to economic decline.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRucTURAL CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 6, 23 (1981).
107. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
108. Dreyfus presents a different analysis:
Inventors were hurt in two ways [because of the Lear case and its progeny].... First, the
research community as a whole was forced to bear a new risk. Faced with the difficulty of
determining ex ante whether an invention would be innovative enough to merit a patent, yet
apparently stripped of the option of state law protection, inventors were forced to discount the
expected return from their discoveries by the probability that a patent would (rightly or
wrongly) fail to issue or subsequently be invalidated, causing the invention to fall into the
public domain before the costs of developing it could be recouped. Second, [it] directly
[Vol. 69:215
NO-CHALLENGE TERMINATION CLAUSES
create.' O9 Under such clauses, the inventor/licensor bears less risk of
litigation because the licensee risks losing the license if it chooses to
challenge the validity of the patent. The licensor, then, has an alternative to
filing suit against the licensee for its infringing activities; a task that is likely
to be costly and difficult since the licensor may be large, wealthy, and
resourceful." ° Consequently, the licensee is discouraged from using its
leverage to enter into bad faith negotiations with the licensor, knowing that
it will not necessarily be able to make the invention without paying royalties
by leaving the licensor no choice but to sue or abandon its rights."'
For the same reasons, the inventor is encouraged to license. Japan and its
neighbors" 2 are ahead of the United States in some industries partially
because they are more efficient at producing inventions." 3 Licensing is a
way to use technology more efficiently." 4 It is cheaper for an inventor to
give someone with resources the rights to make, use, or sell an invention than
to attempt to raise the money herself. A licensee that already has access to
capital and equipment can place the product on the market more quickly. In
addition, licensees are more willing to enter into licensing agreements because
the lower risk of litigation reduces the licensee's royalty rates."'
A fourth reason why Lear should not detrimentally affect no-challenge
termination clauses is that empowering the licensor through patent law
encourages the licensor to use the patent system." 6 At some point, an
inventor must decide whether to protect her invention through state trade
secret law or through an expensive patent process. The patent system is
usually most desirable to the patentee, especially if the risks of using it are
not too high. Public policy holds the patent system superior to trade secret
law since, under a patent, the inventor's monopoly ends after seventeen years,
while trade secrets have no term."7 Ain additional benefit occurs because
use of the patent system promotes the second neglected policy of disclosing
inventions to the public." 8 No-challenge termination clauses encourage use
discouraged research into obviously unpatentable inventions. Unless inventors could guard and
exploit these discoveries in absolute secrecy, they could never count on a period of exclusivity
in which to capture any of the social benefits their inventions conferred.
Dreyfus, supra note 18, at 689.
109. For a general discussion of the structuring of law to create incentives for innovation, see
KiNGSTON, supra note 21.
110. See generally Silverman, supra note 17.
111. See supra text accompanying note 9.
112. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
114. Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1373 n.3 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
862 (1976); Government's Role, supra note 14, at 50-58 (statement of Loren C. Schmid, Chairman,
Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer); Patent Law Improvements Act, supra note 5,
74 (statement of Bernarr R. Pravel, President, American Intellectual Property Law Association). One
case gives a further reason to encourage licensing: foreign licensing provides a large source of income
for the United States. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253, 1257 n.4 (6th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 939 (1974).
115. See supra note 5.
116. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1974); Troxel Mfg., 465 F.2d at 1258.
117. See CHOATE, supra note 47, at 7, for a comparison of patent and trade secret law.
118. See supra note 79.
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of the patent system by giving the potential patentee a way to reduce its risks
through efficient licensing agreements.
Finally, while no-challenge termination clauses foster the goals articulated
in Dawson Chemical of encouraging inventions and disclosure of ideas,"19
what makes the device most attractive is that it does so without unduly
impairing the Lear policy of ensuring that patents are valid.' Licensees
may still claim patent invalidity, but they do so at the risk of losing their
licenses. If the licensee has a non-frivolous claim, it bears little risk of having
to discontinue its use of the invention. Thus, no-challenge termination clauses
encourage good faith,'21 legitimate patent invalidity claims while filtering
out bad faith negotiations and suits 2 2 that take advantage of disproportionate
resources. 123
The ability of no-challenge termination clauses to support both innovation
and valid patents .is aided by the post-Lear development of "reexamination."
Since 1985, anyone can request that the Patent and Trademark Office examine
119. This preceding analysis is based upon general law and economics theory. Posner says that "[t]he
definition of property rights can itself be viewed as a process of figuring out what measures parties
would agree to ... in order to create incentives to avoid wasting valuable resources." PoSNER, supra
note 1, at 253. For a discussion of the increasing use of law and economics in patent law, see John W.
Schlicher, If Economic Welfare Is the Goal, Will Economic Analysis Redefine Patent Law?, 4 J.
PROPRIETARY RTs. 12 (1992). For a discussion of the proper role of law and economics in antitrust law,
see Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a
Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (1986).
120. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
121. For two possible examples of "bad faith" licensing negotiations, see RCA Corp. v. Data General
Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1989), and C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 875 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
122. Decreasing litigation is in itself a legitimate goal of judicial decision-making. The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this policy in Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding that a consent judgment can preclude validity challenges) and Hemstreet v. Spiegal, Inc.,
851 F.2d 348 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (indicating that settlement agreements which preclude validity challenges
are enforceable). Both of these cases incorporated the important policy of res judicata in their analysis.
A symposium in 1989 by the Stanford International Center for Law and Technology and the Stanford
Law and Technology Association included discussions of the problem of increased litigation in the
important industry of semi-conductors. The emphasis of the talks was on small, start-up companies in
the area of semi-conductors. The experts agreed that:
[E]specially since 1980, intellectual property litigation in Silicon Valley has become more
frequent and intense, the power balance has shifted against start-ups and the venture capitalists
have become more cautious. Although most start-up companies are launched without lawsuits,
litigation has become so common that many start-ups today draw up their business plans with
built-in litigation contingencies.
•.. The start-up can ill afford litigation. It needs to devote its money, time and resources to
technology development. Furthermore, the threat of an expensive lawsuit may be enough to
scare away the start-up's venture capital financing. Patent lawsuits cost from about $500,000
per claim brought to trial, and trade secret suits cost from $300,000 to $500,000. Thus, lawsuits
costs can amount to a significant fraction of the venture capitalist's total investment in the
start-up, which is typically in the range of $1 to $6 million over a period of several years. Even
where no suit is filed, the litigious climate means that a start-up must spend money on
preventative measures, such as researching possible patent conflicts and redesigning or
licensing its way around any conflicts in its decisions. These preventative measures cut into
the venture capitalist's return on investment.
Silverman, supra note 17, at 159-60.
123. See supra text accompanying note 111. See generally Silverman, supra note 17.
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the validity of a patent a second time.' 24 Such a request can be made
anonymously 12 or can be made sua sponte by the Patent and Trademark
Office. 2 6 Furthermore, a court will not bar a reexamination if a licensee
requests it in breach of the license. 2 7 The cost of a reexamination request
is significantly cheaper than the cost of litigating a validity suit. 2 This
development nullifies the Lear Court's best reason for outlawing what they
thought was licensee estoppel: "[l]icensees may often be the only individuals
with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of the
inventor's discovery." 29 The possibility of a cheap, accessible way to
challenge patents minimizes the threat that no-challenge termination clauses
will hamper the federal goal of valid patents. 3 '
Lear should have had little direct effect on the enforceability of no-
challenge termination clauses because the holding did not include them and
they balance the Court's concern of encouraging valid patents as well as the
constitutional policy of spurring innovation. Yet today such clauses are
infrequently used for fear of unenforceability precisely when they would be
most useful as the United States faces its greatest economic challenge in fifty
years. One of the reasons such clauses are still infrequently used is because
many courts chose to expand Lear's holding.
II. THE LEAR PROGENY AND ITS IMPACT ON No-CHALLENGE TERMINATION
CLAUSES
Many federal courts interpreted Lear very broadly to give licensors even
less leverage than they had under Lear.' The courts imposed restrictions
on licensors in five areas: no-challenge clauses,3 2 judicial consent judg-
ments,133 settlement agreements,"' royalties in escrow,'35 and licensor
powers of license termination in response to royalty withholdings. 6 Though
124. 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(a) (1992).
125. Id. § 1.510(b).
126. Id. § 1.520(b).
127. Joy Mfg. Co. v. National Mine Serv., Inc., 810 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
128. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20.
129. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
130. Rooldidge, considering the effect of reexamination on no-challenge clauses, concludes that
"times have changed since Lear, and the relevant attitudes and policies concerning no-challenge clauses
have changed with them. Blind extension of Lear to render no-challenge clauses per se unenforceable
is indefensible. Rather, that clause should be judged under a rule of reason standard, considering its
economic effect" Rooklidge, supra note 11, at 84. For a discussion of the rule of reason standard, see
supra note 104.
13 1. See generally Ellen S. Friedman, The Enforceability ofPatent SettlementAgreements After Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 715 (1981); Jennings & Bryan, supra note 11; McCarthy, supra note
78; Rooklidge, supra note 5, at 6-14; Schlicher, supra note 5, at 433-35; Steven Z. Szczepanski,
Adversarial Proceedings Between Licensors and Licensees of Patent Rights-An Overview, 9 LIcENs.
LAW AND Bus. REP. 85, 90-95 (1986).
132. See infra part H.A.
133. See infra part II.B.
134. See infra part H.B.
135. See infra part II.C.
136. See infra part H.C.
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no court has ruled directly on no-challenge termination clauses, the Lear
progeny's broadening of Lear has made the enforceability of such provisions
dubious.
A. No-Challenge Clauses.37
Soon after the United States Supreme Court decided Lear, lower courts
struck down no-challenge clauses in case after case without exception. 38
Many lower courts invalidated these provisions without analysis. They simply
assumed that Lear made the unenforceability of no-challenge clauses obvious.
In Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Laboratories, Inc.,39
the licensor brought an action against two licensees to recoup royalties under
the license agreements. 4 ' The licensees defended on the ground that the
patent was invalid.' 4' Though the court found for the plaintiff and thus did
not need to rule on the validity of the no-challenge license provision,"' it
did so anyway with no other explanation than that each defendant "violated
the no-contest covenant of the respective license agreements, but that
covenant does not estop defendants from challenging the patent's validi-
ty."'1 43 The court gave absolutely no consideration to the distinguishable fact
that the licensees agreed not to challenge the patent's validity, despite the
facts that the parties to the agreement were competent and there was no
fraud.' 44 This confidence in invalidating no-challenge clauses without
analysis would prove indicative of the approach of courts in future rulings on
these provisions.
137. No-challenge clauses are license provisions which prevent licensees from challenging the
validity of the licensed patent. Such a clause should be distinguished from a no-challenge termination
clause. The latter provision is less restrictive, for it merely allows the licensor to terminate a license if
the licensee undertakes a validity challenge; no-challenge clauses legally bar such challenges. While
many courts have specifically struck down no-challenge clauses, none have dealt with no-challenge
termination clauses. The rulings on no-challenge clauses that are provided in this section, however, may
affect the legality of no-challenge termination provisions since these decisions demonstrate that the
lower courts were willing to ignore contractual freedom in order to expand the Lear reasoning.
138. Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 965 (1973); Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911
(1970); Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 197 U.S.P.Q. 657 (D.D.C. 1978); Wallace Clark &
Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uniroyal, Inc. v. ACS Indus., Inc., 185
U.S.P.Q. 522 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), aft'd, 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975); Milton G. Waldbaum Co.
v. Roberts Dairy Co., 325 F. Supp. 772 (D. Neb. 1971); Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact
Lens Lab., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
139. Plastic Contact Lens, 330 F. Supp. 441.
140. Id. at 442.
141. Id. at 443.
142. The license provided that "Ithe LICENSEE agrees to refrain from either directly or indirectly
attacking the validity of said Letters Patent licensed under this agreement during the term of this
agreement." Id. at 442.
143. Id. at 443 (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)).
144. The court stated in another part of the opinion that "[e]ach defendant was represented by
counsel at the time the license agreement was entered into, and entered into the license agreement freely,
voluntarily and with full understanding of the terms thereof, and without any fraud, misrepresentation
or duress (physical, economic or otherwise) by plaintiff in the inducement." Id. at 442.
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The no-challenge clause question was first before a federal appellate court
in Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc.'45 In Bendix, the licensor brought an
infringement suit against the licensee, and the licensee claimed that the patent
was invalid.'46 Further, the licensee said that the patent was misused
because a no-challenge clause was included in the license.'47 The provision
purported to prevent the licensee from challenging the patent's validity
beyond the license term. 4 In holding the patent invalid, the Seventh Circuit
commented on the no-challenge clause issue.1 49 Like the Plastic Contact
Lens case, the Circuit equated the demise of licensee estoppel in Lear with the
unenforceability of no-challenge clauses:
While it is true that a valid patent does afford some "limited protection"
... this is no answer to the thrust of defendants' contention that the
licensor may not thereby forever preclude the licensee from challenging
the validity of the patent [through use of the no-challenge provision].
[S]ubsequent to the judgment of the district court under consideration here,
the Supreme Court in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins ... overruled the holding of
Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.
.. From all this we can only conclude that the right to estop licensees
from challenging a patent is not part of the "limited protection" [afforded
by the patent monopoly]. 5S
The court then remanded the issue of whether or not the no-challenge clause
constituted patent misuse since Lear was not decided until after the trial.''
Two years later, the Seventh Circuit again considered the Bendix issue in
Panther Pumps & Equipment Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc.'52 In that case, patentee
Panther Pumps sued Hydrocraft for infringing its patent of a paint spray-gun
145. Bendix, 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1970).
146. Id. at 810.
147. Id. at 810, 820. The misuse defense denies relief to the patentee when the patentee illegally tries
to extend the patent monopoly. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980).
The Federal Circuit requires defendants to show that the alleged misuse be anti-competitive in actual
effect in order to have a prima facie claim. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986). For an overview of the misuse defense, see Gerald Sobel,
Recent Developments in Patent Law, 334 PRAc. L. INST. PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, INTELL. PROPJANTiTRUST 7, 14 (1992).
148. Bendix, 421 F.2d at 820.
149. Id. at 821.
150. Id. at 820-21.
151. Id. at 821. This case can be limited to its facts. First, the no-challenge clause forever prevented
the licensee from challenging the patent's validity. As to this fact the court commented that "[s]uch
danger [of unwarranted monopolization] may be even greater here than in the usual licensee-estoppel
case for the reason that in the instant case the licensor sought to create an irrevocable estoppel, not one
merely extending during the life of the licenses and sales agreements." Id. Further, the defendant alleged
that through its licensing and sales agreements, the licensor had "blanketed" 75% of the market for the
invention. Each agreement contained a no-challenge clause like the one in defendant's license. Id. at
820. Notice that these facts could mean the licensor violated antitrust law--the correct result under the
pre-Lear idea of estoppel. See supra part I.B.1 (concluding that the pre-Lear case law maintained the
proper balance between the risks of the parties to a patent license). Because the claim was misuse, the
Seventh Circuit should have limited its analysis to antitrust violations and not implied that no-challenge
clauses are per se unenforceable.
152. Panther Pumps, 468 F.2d 225 (1972).
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part.' 53 Among other contentions, Hydrocraft defended on the theory that the
plaintiff misused'54 the patent by including no-challenge clauses in the
licenses, though the licensees to these licenses were not parties to the
litigation.'55 The Seventh Circuit once again stated that the no-challenge
clause was not enforceable-a finding that was completely extraneous to the
holding.'5 6 The court's analysis was, similar to that in Bendix and Plastic
Contact Lens, limited to a mere citation of the Lear case: "[i]n Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins ... the Supreme Court held that a licensee is not estopped to
challenge the validity of a patent; in view of that holding, the 'no contest'
provision in the LEMCO license is plainly unenforceable."'' 57 This time,
however, the court refused to rule that the provision constituted patent misuse
since the plaintiff did not use the provision to limit competition.' 51
These post-Lear decisions concerning the validity of no-challenge clauses
affect the validity of no-challenge termination clauses in two ways. First,
because the courts assumed in haste that no-challenge clauses were equivalent
to judicially-imposed licensee estoppel, without even mentioning counterargu-
ments,' "59 they might take the same approach in analyzing the enforceability
153. Id. at 226. Specifically, the patent was on the gun's hydraulic pump, improving the efficiency
of the gun's ability to pause operations while spraying was discontinued.
154. For an explanation of the misuse defense, see supra note 147.
155. Panther Pumps, 468 F.2d at 226. The license in question provided that:
During the life of this Agreement or any extension or continuation thereof, LEMCO
agrees not to contest the validity of PANTHER Patent Number 3,254,845 or any
continuation divisions or reissues thereof or any corresponding foreign patents, provided
however that no royalties shall become payable under this Agreement on subject matter
of claims after a finding of invalidity of such claims by any competent court of final
Appellate Jurisdiction.
Id. at 230-31. This case is distinguishable from Bendix. First, the no-challenge clause was limited to the
term of the license, unlike the Bendix clause. Furthermore, the party claiming the misuse was not the
licensee. The court recognized the first distinction, saying, "The case would, of course, present a
different issue if either the license provision or the patentee's exploitation of his patent produced
economic consequences raising serious questions under the antitrust laws. Such questions were...
raised in Bendix Corporation v. Balax, Inc . ..'" Id. at 232.
156. The holding was that, among other things, there was no misuse by the plaintiff. The court said,
"We hold that the 'no-contest' clause in the LEMCO license, though unenforceable under Lear, does
not constitute the kind of 'misuse' of the patent which forecloses recovery of damages from an
unlicensed infringer." Id. at 232.
157. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 232-33. Other courts subsequently reached the same result. Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus
Wavin, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D.D.C. 1978) ('Though no-contest clauses indubitably are
unenforceable against the licensee under Lear, Inc. v. Adkins ... such a clause, standing alone, is
unlikely to constitute patent misuse. ... .") (citing Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468
F.2d 225, 231-32 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973)); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("[W]hile the Court, of course, does not
stamp with approval this provision which is plainly unenforceable against a licensee challenging validity,
the application of the doctrine of patent misuse to bar enforcement of Congoleum's patents would be
too drastic ... ).
159. For the position that no-challenge clauses should not be per se unenforceable, see Rooklidge,
supra note 5 at 89-90. Rooklidge believes that no-challenge clauses should be judged by a "rule of
reason." For an explanation of the "rule of reason," see supra note 104. Rooklidge reviews the economic
benefits and detriments of no-challenge clauses. Rooklidge, supra note 5 at 84-88. The chief detriment,
says Rooklidge, is that consumers are hurt because they pay for the licensee's royalties to the licensor
for use of an invalid patent. Notice that this detriment is not as applicable to no-challenge termination
clauses since a licensee will be able to challenge and will challenge the validity of the patent if it knows
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of no-challenge termination clauses. Both devices are contract oriented, but
these courts gave no weight whatsoever to interests in and benefits from
contractual freedom, even though these interests were not present in Lear.
Second, the courts' refusals to find that no-challenge clauses constitute per
se misuse indicates that it is feasible to analyze the enforceability of no-
challenge termination clauses in accordance with the pre-Lear idea of licensee
estoppel. Only when the clause limits competition illegally, as it might have
in Bendix, should courts not enforce such clauses. This position is enhanced
by the fact that no-challenge termination clauses are less restrictive than no-
challenge clauses and the fact that no-challenge termination clauses foster
critical constitutional policies.1 61
B. Settlement Agreements and Consent Decrees that Prohibit
Licensee Validity Challenges
Two more areas in which many courts expanded the Lear holding are no-
challenge clauses in settlement agreements and consent decrees.' 6' The
Ninth Circuit struck down a no-challenge clause in a settlement agreement in
Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertising Co.
162
Though the court recognized the policies of settlement and lessening
litigation, it said that these interests "must give way to the policy favoring
frde competition in ideas not meriting patent protection."'
163
The Second Circuit agreed with Golden State in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Allied Chemical Corp."s After Allied counter-claimed against Warner-
Jenkinson for infringing Allied's food coloring patent, 65 the two parties
entered into a settlement agreement that gave Warner-Jenkinson a license in
exchange for royalties to Allied. The agreement prevented the licensee from
that it is likely to succeed. As Rooklidge explains, the licensee may have enough incentive in reducing
its costs to sue for invalidity and enable itself to use the invention for free. No-challenge termination
provisions allow a licensee to enjoy the benefit of patent protection until it has the resources to take
such action. Simultaneously, such a provision deters bad faith suits by the licensee. See supra notes 121-
23 and accompanying text. Rooklidge concludes with respect to no-challenge clauses that "[tihe
considerations discussed... compel the conclusion that no-challenge clauses are not manifestly anti-
competitive." Rooklidge, supra note 5, at 88 (emphasis in text). He believes that the major problem in
analyzing these devices is that the benefits and detriments are difficult to quantify. Id. (citing Ordover,
Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual Property, 53
AN=rrRUST L.J. 503,504 (1984)); see also Turner, Basic Principles in FormulatingAntitrust and Misuse
Constraints on the Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 488 (1984).
These conclusions are similarly applicable to no-challenge termination clause analysis.
160. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
161. The Lear progeny's attack on settlement agreements and consent decrees is important because
these are areas in which the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has flatly disagreed with the Lear line of
case law. See infra notes 212-29 and accompanying text.
162. Golden State, 444 F.2d 425 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971); accord, Crane Co.
v. Aeroquip Corp., 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974); Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d
1366 (7th Cir. 1974); cf. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 489 F.2d 974 (7th
Cir. 1973).
163. Golden State, 444 F.2d at 427.
164. Warner-Jenkinson, 567 F.2d 184 (1977).
165. Id. at 185.
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terminating the license for a two year period. 166 The court found that this
provision was unenforceable under Lear even though it was part of a
settlement agreement, reasoning that the licensee should be able to terminate
the license if it successfully challenges the patent's validity. 7
Some courts held that consent decrees' 68 were contrary to Lear. In
Business Forms Finishing Service, Inc. v. Carson,169 the Seventh Circuit
held that a consent decree which provided that the plaintiff's patent was valid
but not infringed was unenforceable, 7 ' even though the defendants did not
contend that it was unenforceable.' The court cited Lear, Inc. v. Adkins
and emphasized that "patent licensees 'may often be the only individuals with
enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's
discovery."""
The nonenforcement of settlement agreements and consent decrees
indicates that some courts were willing to expand Lear to its outer limits. As
in the case of no-challenge clauses, these courts did not spend much effort
considering counter-policies. Instead, they concluded that the unenforceability
of these devices was a simple extension of Lear. As this Note discusses,
however, the Federal Circuit's treatment of consent decrees and settlement
166. Id. at 186.
167. Id. at 188. The Second Circuit reasoned that:
[T]he seeming inequity of allowing a licensee to keep his license while he attacks the
validity of the licensor's patent is outweighed by the public interest in placing no
impediment in the way of those in the best position to contest the validity of the
underlying patent .... [W]e are not persuaded by appellee's argument that enforcement
of a royalties agreement should prevail where that agreement was part of a litigation
settlement.... If encouragement of [patent validity challenges] is important enough to
justify allowing licensees to sue to invalidate patents, then it makes little sense for us to
strain to preserve the termination of such litigation through a settlement.... [T]he Lear
decision militates against reading such provisions into a settlement agreement.
Id.
168. A consent decree is defined as a judgment to which the litigating parties agree. Such a device
differs from a settlement agreement in that the latter may decide issues without prejudice, while a
consent decree necessarily incorporates the idea of res judicata. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 410, 1372
(6th ed. 1990).
169. Business Forms, 452 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1971); accord Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g
& Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978); Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366
(7th Cir. 1974); cf. Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 976 (1976); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 912 (1976); American Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544, 548 (1986);
Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391 (2d Cir. 1973); Schnitger v. Canoga Elec.
Corp., 462 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1972); Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1343
(E.D. La. 1980); Butterfield v. Oculus Contact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750, 760 (N.D. I1. 1971). For
articles covering the Lear progeny's treatment of consent decrees, see John W. Schlicher, Judicial
Regulation of Patent Licensing, Litigation and Settlement Under Judicial Policies Created in Lear v.
Adldns, 3 A. INTELL. PROP. L.A. SPECIAL LEGAL PAPERS 1-1 (1985); Ellen S. Friedman, Comment, The
Enforceability of Patent Settlement Agreements After Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 715
(1981); Cheryl L. Johnson, Note, "To Bind or Not to Bind": Bar and Merger Treatment of Consent
Decrees in Patent Infringement Litigation, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 1322 (1974); and Alexandra Leake,
Comment, Res Judicata Effect of Consent Judgments in Patent Litigation, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L.
REv. 66 (1976).
170. Business Forms, 452 F.2d at 75.
171. Id. at 70.
172. Id. at 74 (quoting Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (1969)).
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agreements indicates that the Lear progeny's assumptions are subject to
attack.' 73
C. Escrow Accounts and the Licensor's Ability to Terminate the
License When Licensees Stop Paying Royalties
Possibly the case law most threatening to no-challenge termination clauses
came in the form of preventing licensors from terminating licenses in response
to licensees filing validity suits and ceasing royalty payments. 74 When
courts allowed licensees to maintain the license during suit by placing royalty
payments in escrow to be later recouped by the licensee should the licensee's
suit succeed, they created another limit to the licensor's leverage.
Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp. 75 became one of the most often cited cases
in this area. In Crane, a settlement agreement included a license that covered
a patent on an air-conditioning system mechanism. The license agreement
stated that:
[s]hould AEROQUIP fail to make payments as provided in Sections 3 and
4, CRANE shall have the right to terminate the exclusive license.., and
to elect a nonexclusive license grant .... In the event of termination of
the exclusive license under this Agreement by CRANE, AEROQUIP shall
not be relieved of its obligation for the payments .... 176
About a year into the agreement and without notice to licensor Crane, the
licensee Aeroquip started manufacturing and selling "modified" versions of
these mechanisms. 77 These "modified" mechanisms were marked with the
patent number of the licensed patent mechanism. Aeroquip refused to pay
royalties on the "modified" mechanisms and thereafter licensor Crane filed
suit for breach to recover the royalties.' 78 Aeroquip defended on the grounds
that the "modified" mechanisms did not infringe the patent and that the patent
was invalid. 7 9 Licensor Crane then terminated the agreement, justifying its
173. See infra notes 212-29 and accompanying text.
174. These cases allowed a licensee "to have its cake and eat it too," for a licensee had little to lose
from suing for patent invalidity: if it won, it could continue using the invention without paying royalties;
if it lost, it still had a contract with the licensor that enabled the licensee to profit from the invention.
Because licenses may be non-exclusive, a licensee with an advantage in wealth would almost always
have an interest in bringing suit under this case law, unless the licensee knows that there is no likelihood
of success. If the licensee is operating under a non-exclusive license, it is likely that it has competition
already, so that destroying the patent monopoly will have little negative economic effect. In fact, the
economic effect of a winning validity suit by the licensee would be highly beneficial to it in the short
run. The manufacturing process may be so expensive that entry by potential competitors is unlikely.
Furthermore, even if the market is relatively easy to enter, the licensee still has the experience and the
resources in place to make, use, or sell the product more efficiently than others just entering the market.
Finally, the licensee's position is further enhanced since it no longer needs to pay royalties, increasing
its wealth and productive capability.
175. Crane, 356 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. I11. 1973), modifiedon other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.
1974).
176. Id. at 735-36.
177. Id. at 735, 737.




actions on the grounds that Aeroquip had breached the royaltkr provision and
that Aeroquip's assertion of the patent's invalidity was effectively a
repudiation of the license. 8
The Northern District of Illinois interpreted both of Crane's arguments as
"essentially" an attempt to justify license termination "because the licensee
has raised the validity defense.''. The court reasoned that absent Lear,
Crane's contentions constituted grounds for termination of the license.' 2
The court concluded, however, that:
[T]he policy considerations found to be determinative in the Lear case
should have equal force here .... Although the facts and issues in Lear
required the court to go no further than to hold that the doctrine of
licensee estoppel would no longer be a defense available to licensors and
that a licensee would be able to challenge the validity of the patent
without having to continue paying royalties ... the rationale of Lear must
surely extend to the converse situation raised in this case .... [J]ust as the
imposition of the doctrine of licensee estoppel would have a chilling effect
on meritorious challenges to patents ... so would the threat of termination
of the license have a similar effect. If raising the defense of validity were
sufficient grounds for terminating a license, then licensees might hesitate
to challenge a patent because of the potential sanction in doing so.' 83
The court rejected the argument that barring termination of the license would
effectively allow Aeroquip to maintain a monopoly on the "modified" parts
and simultaneously prevent Crane from benefiting from its invention.'84 The
court's response to this contention was that the policy of promoting valid
patents through validity suits outweighs such detriments to the licensor. 5
Crane took Lear to the extreme. No longer was the judiciary protecting a
licensee's capacity to challenge validity as it did in Lear and in the areas of
no-challenge clauses, settlement agreements, and consent decrees. Instead, the
court articulated a willingness to eliminate any devices that may "threat[en]"
or "chill" the licensee's eagerness to challenge the validity of the patent. This
approach detrimentally affects the incentive to innovate and license. Crane not
180. Id.
181. Id. at 738 (emphasis in original).
182. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
Basically, Crane's contention is that Aeroquip's repudiation of the validity of the patent
and its manufacture, sale, and marking of the "modified" [parts], without payment of
royalties thereon, are sufficient grounds for Crane to unilaterally terminate the license.
Certainly the aforesaid facts would as a matter of contract law be persuasive support for
Crane's argument. However, as the Court stated in Lear:. "Surely the equities of the
licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are balanced against the important public
interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a
part of the public domain."
Id. (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1969)).
183. Id. at 738-39 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 739. This is so because the license was exclusive, preventing Crane from granting licenses
to others. Of course, this monopoly would only last until the end of the suit. Unfortunately for licensors,
however, patent suits are notoriously lengthy. See H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820
F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Keith V. Rockey, Overview of a Patent Suit: The Decision to File, in
PATENT LITIGATION 1991, (PRAc. L. INST. PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP.




only encourages a licensee to enter into bad faith negotiations for a license in
order to eventually make, use, or sell the product without paying royal-
ties, "'86 but it creates a situation where it would be foolish for the licensee
not to "modify" the product, wait for the licensor to sue for royalties, and
attempt to draw out the litigation. During litigation, the licensee profits from
the product without paying royalties or incurring competition from other
licensees.187 The licensor, on the other hand, must incur litigation without
collecting royalties and, if the licensee holds an exclusive license, without the
right to license the patent to another. No-challenge termination clauses would
help avoid this result by allowing licensors to free themselves from agree-
ments so that they could sue for infringement and benefit from their patents
by entering into other licenses.
The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits expanded the licensee's
power even more than Crane and Lear with respect to royalties. In Lear,
although the court released the licensee from royalty obligations of the license
during suit, 88 the licensee had repudiated the license by refusing to pay
royalties.8 9 In Crane, the licensee also continued the license obligations
under the patent by claiming that the "modified" mechanisms did not fall
under the license. The appellate court decisions, however, would go so far as
to allow licensees to avoid royalty payments during suit without repudiating
the license by putting the royalties in escrow.
The Sixth Circuit 9 ' reached this result in Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc.
v. Moraine Products,'9' by reasoning that escrow royalties "is a commend-
able procedure to preserve the status quo during the course of litigation" and
would be a "strong 'inducement [for the licensee]... to challenge the
patent."" 92 The Ninth Circuit endorsed this analysis in St. Regis Paper Co.
v. Royal Industries193 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the widespread
186. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
187. Another district court reached the same result with respect to a patent that was not "modified."
In Lee v. Lee Custom Eng'g Inc., 476 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Wis. 1979), the court found that the "speed
and efficiency" gained by allowing licensees to withhold royalties while challenging the validity of
patents would be lost if licensors could terminate licenses, even though it "may seem unfair to allow
the licensee to continue receiving benefits under the license agreement while depriving the licensor of
royalties." Id. at 363-64 (citing Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 356 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
modified on other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974)). Contra Nebraska Eng'g Corp. v. Shivvers,
557 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1977); Telectronics Pty. Ltd. v. Cordis Corp., 533 F. Supp. 453 (D. Minn.
1982); Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., v. International Salt Co., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 748, 750-51 (N.D.
N.Y. 1974); In re Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1211, 1216 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984).
188. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
189. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 659 (1969).
190. The Sixth Circuit seemed to be on the opposite course in two earlier cases. The court first held
that a licensee could not recoup all royalties nor royalties during appeal where it was successful in
challenging the patent's validity. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir.
1972) (Troxel 1). The court later ruled that the licensee must pay royalties accruing prior to the final
invalidity decision. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 489 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 939 (1974) (Troxel II).
191. Atlas, 509 F.2d I (6th Cir. 1974).
192. Id. at 6-7 (citing Troxel I, 465 F.2d at 1257).
193. St. Regis Paper, 552 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977).
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acceptance of this position and adopted it in Precision Shooting Equipment
Co. v. Allen' 94 as did the Second Circuit in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied
Chemical Corp.'95
As these courts continued to destroy any potential impediments to a
validity suit by a licensee, the likelihood of a no-challenge termination clause
withstanding judicial scrutiny decreased. Lear and its progeny would allow
licensees to sue licensors for patent invalidity without paying royalties while
simultaneously holding the licensor to its obligations under the license. Under
this scenario licensees took little if any risk in bringing suit. Unfortunately,
licensors bear great risk in entering into licensing agreements in the first
place, for the Lear progeny drastically increased the chances that licensors
would be forced to pay for expensive and possibly lengthy litigation while not
receiving any benefit from the licensed patent. Because the progeny also
struck down no-challenge clauses in licenses, settlement agreements, and
consent decrees, the licensor had no leverage against the licensee. If the
courts were willing to favor licensees this much, it is no wonder that many
attorneys assumed that no-challenge termination clauses were probably
unenforceable. However, the tide changed in the early 1980's with the
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
III. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF NO-CHALLENGE TERMINATION
CLAUSES UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT' 96
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 established the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals. 97 In order to make patent law more uniform and
to alleviate the regional circuits' burden of dealing with specialized technical
matters, 98 Congress gave the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over all patent
appeals from the district courts and from the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice. 19
9
During many of the same years that the Reagan Justice Department took
a strong stance in favor of patentees,"' the Federal Circuit likewise favored
patentees more than the regional circuits did and proceeded to shift modern
194. Precision Shooting, 646 F.2d 313, 321 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981)
("Under the challenge approach adopted by the district court, all the post-challenge royalties are safely
in escrow for whomever may be found to be entitled to them. It appears delay in the resolution of the
controversy favors neither party. Nor is either party made to assume risks not necessary to the resolution
of validity. We adopt that approach. It is not a new one.").
195. Warner-Jenkinson, 567 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir: 1977).
196. For a discussion of whether a district court would be bound to use the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of Lear in ruling on the enforceability of no-challenge clauses, see supra note 28.
197. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
198. Chemical Eng'g Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1),(4)(A) (1988). The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over other matters
such as trademark appeals and international trade appeals. Id. § 1295 (a)(l)-(7) (1988).
200. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 69:215
NO-CHALLENGE TERMINATION CLAUSES
patent law significantly in favor of inventors.2"' Over the course of a
decade, the court repeatedly emphasized the policy of stimulating innovation
through patent protection.2 2 Consequently, the Federal Circuit has height-
ened the burden on infringers who attempt to challenge the validity of the
patent as a defense. 203 While the Lear Court viewed a patent as a mere
"legal conclusion" by the Patent and Trademark Office, 204 the Circuit takes
the view that "[a] patent is born valid."205
Furthermore, the Circuit took a more lenient approach towards patent-
antitrust issues. Unlike Lear and its progeny of case law, the Federal Circuit
does not scrutinize patents suspiciously, but instead emphasizes that patent
law and antitrust law are complementary because they both are designed to
promote competition. 2°6
Together, these two policy shifts-antitrust relaxation and heightened
presumptions of patent validity-reached into the scope of licensee validity
201. See generally Gerald Sobel, The Shift in Patent Law Following the Establishment of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and Recent Developments, 287 PRAc. L. INST. PATS., CO'YRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, INTELL. PROPJANTITRUST 7 (1990).
202. Atlantic ThermoPlastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating
that patent law is intended to foster licensing and innovation); Amgen, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("A continuing goal of Congress is to encourage
innovation by providing meaningful protection for the inventions and discoveries of American inventors
and for the manufacture of innovative products made by American workers . . . ."'); Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that both antitrust and patent
law are "aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition"); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine
Tool Works Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 744 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that the one purpose
of the establishment of the Federal Circuit was "to foster technological growth and industrial
innovation"); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1574 n.28 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The
patent system, which is rooted in the... Constitution... serves a very positive function in our system
of competition, i.e., 'the encouragement of investment based risk' .... By so doing, it 'encourages
innovation and its fruits: new jobs and new industries, new consumer goods and trade benefits .... "')
(citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d
1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); and Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599, modified
on other grounds, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); In re Wiggens, 488 F.2d 538, 543 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
("mhe purpose sought to be effectuated by the patent law is the encouragement of innovation.'). The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decisions are binding authority for the Federal Circuit.
203. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982) provides that "[a] patent shall be presumed valid .... The burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting invalidity." While
some circuits already required a plaintiff to prove clearly and convincingly that the patent was invalid,
Del Mar Eng'g Lab. v. Physio-Tronics, Inc., 642 F.2d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1981); Tights, Inc. v. Acme-
McCrary Corp., 541 F.2d 1047 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Gaddis v. Calgon
Corp., 506 F.2d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 1975); Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d
866, 871 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294, 298 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930 (1974), others required a plaintiff to prove invalidity by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 795 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
825 (1978); Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1055 (1976); Lorenz v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1962). The Federal Circuit
requires the plaintiff to introduce clear and convincing evidence. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
774 F.2d 1082, 1090-91 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Federal Circuit has also ruled that the introduction of
prior art not previously considered by the Patent and Trademark Office does not weaken the
presumption of validity. Lindemeann Machinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
204. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
205. Roper Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
206. Loctite, 781 F.2d at 876.
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challenges and royalty obligations. Though the Federal Circuit often affirmed
'the narrow holding of Lear, it refused to extend the holding as the Lear line
of case law eagerly did.20 7 In fact, the court reversed these rulings in the
areas of settlement agreements, 20 8  consent decrees,20 9 escrow pay-
ments,' ° and licensor termination powers in response to a licensee's
cessation of royalty payments. 21" The Federal Circuit did not rule on the
validity of no-challenge clauses, but through its departure from the aforemen-
tioned Lear progeny doctrines the court implicitly indicated that no-challenge
termination clauses are enforceable.
A. The Federal Circuit's View of Settlement Agreements and Consent
Decrees that Prohibit Licensee Validity Challenges
The Federal Circuit directly reversed the Lear progeny of case law with
respect to settlement agreements and consent decrees that prohibit licensee
validity challenges. Though many circuits perceived the Lear policy of
allowing licensees to challenge validity as restrictionless, the Federal Circuit
indicated that this policy was indeed vulnerable to countervailing interests.
In Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc.,212 after a week of trial proceedings, the
parties entered into a settlement agreement which stated that "the issues of
validity, enforceability and infringement.., are hereby finally concluded and
disposed of."2" 3 The agreement further provided that. the licensee had to
continue paying royalties "notwithstanding that said patents-in-suit may be
held invalid and/or unenforceable in any other proceeding at a later
date[.]" 214 The licensee later brought suit, claiming that the patent was
invalid because a district court had earlier found that the patentee had
committed inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office in the
application process, making the patent unenforceable.2"5 The licensee asked
the court to deem the license provision unenforceable under Lear.
The Federal Circuit pointed to the strong policy of settlement, 2'6 and
hinted that the licensee's inability to use the district court's decree of the
patent's unenforceability was the licensee's own fault, for it "committed itself
to make payments even if [the patent was held unenforceable]. Now that the
event has happened, [the licensee] seeks to escape commitment. It cannot do
so." 2 7 The court refused to sympathize with the licensee even though the
207. See generally Edmund J. Sease, The Federal Circuit's Short Circuit of Validity Challenges; Or,
Is the Spirit of Lear Dead?, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 229 (1989).
208. See infra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
209. See infra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 230-43 and accompanying text.
212. Hemstreet, 851 F.2d 348 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
213. Id. at 349.
214. Id. at 350.
215. Id. at 349; Hemstreet v. Burroughs Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1096 (.D. Il1. 1987).
216. Hemstreet, 851 F.2d at 350.
217. Id. at 350.
[Vol. 69:215
NO-CHALLENGE TERMINATION CLA USES
judgment that made the patent unenforceable occurred ten years after the
execution of the settlement agreement.1 8 To hold otherwise "would
seriously decrease the willingness of parties to settle litigation on mutually
agreeable terms."2"' The Federal Circuit proceeded to find that the Lear
policy of encouraging valid patents "occup[ied] a subsidiary position" to
settlement interests.220 Hemstreet indicates that the Federal Circuit is
capable of going to great lengths in order to protect a patentee, for the court
allowed the oxymoronic result of permitting a licensor to benefit from a
patent which had judicially been deemed unenforceable in a proceeding
brought by a party other than the licensee.
Three years later, the Federal Circuit again circumvented the Lear policy,
but this time in the context of consent decrees. In Foster v. Hallco Mfg.
Co.,22 the licensee, Foster, and the licensor, Hallco, entered into a consent
judgment which provided that the patents "owned by [Hallco] ... are valid
and enforceable in all respects. ' Four years following this decree, Hallco
demanded that Foster pay royalties for what Foster called "new" and non-
infringing versions of the patent which Foster had begun making and
selling.223 Foster instead sued Hallco, claiming that Hallco's patents were
invalid and that the consent decree was unenforceable because it was
effectively a no-challenge agreement and thus void under Lear.224 The
magistrate below agreed with Foster, pointing out that a consent judgment
often involves minimal judicial scrutiny and little if no evidence, as was the
case here.225
The Federal Circuit reversed, echoing the Lear analysis it set forth in
Hemstreet:
[B]roadly speaking, Lear expresses a policy in favor of precluding
restrictions on attacks on patent validity. However, the Court in Lear did
not deal with the situation where litigation is terminated by a consent
decree which by its terms acknowledges a patent's validity. In such a
situation other public policy considerations come into play, namely, -
preserving the finality of judgments as well as the strong public policy of
encouraging settlements.
... [W]e conclude that general principles of res adjudicata apply, despite
the policies favoring challenges to validity expressed in Lear.226
The language of Foster and Hemstreet favorably affects the enforceability
of no-challenge termination clauses in three distinct ways. First, the cases
demonstrate that Lear should be limited to its facts, for the Supreme Court
218. Id.
219. Id. (citation omitted).
220. Id. at 351.
221. Foster, 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
222. Id. at 472. Thejudgment also provide that"[d]efendant R_ Keith Foster... has infringed claims
of [Hallco's] patents." Id.
223. Id. at 472-73.
224. Id. at 473.
225. Id. (citing Foster v. Halico Mfg. Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1750 (D. Ore. 1989)).
226. Id. at 474-75.
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"did not deal" with consent decrees or settlement agreements. Likewise, the
Court did not consider any agreements by which licensees negotiate not to
challenge the patent's validity-including no-challenge termination clauses;
Lear only invalidated judicially-imposed estoppel. 2 7 Second, the cases show
that the Federal Circuit is not reluctant to balance other policies against the
Lear policy favoring validity challenges. Given the fact that the Federal
Circuit has often espoused the national interest in innovation and patent law's
inherent purpose in fostering that interest,228 it seems likely that the Federal
Circuit would place such interest on the scales against Lear policies in
analyzing the validity of no-challenge termination clauses. Finally, the Federal
Circuit gave weight in these cases to contractual freedom, an interest that no-
challenge termination clauses support. For instance, in Hemstreet the court
implied that the licensee was competent to make the settlement agreement and
would have to accept responsibility for its own actions.229 The Federal
Circuit's benevolence to licensors does not end with consent decrees and
settlement agreements, for the Federal Circuit also rejected the Lear progeny's
holdings as to licensee royalty obligations.
B. The Federal Circuit's View on Licensee Royalty Obligations
and Licensor Termination Powers
While the cases concerning the licensor's right to place royalties in escrow
during a validity challenge and the licensor's right to terminate the license for
non-payment of royalties may have posed the greatest threat to no-challenge
termination clauses in the regional circuits,230 the Federal Circuit's treatment
of these issues provides the greatest support for the clauses. The Federal
Circuit gave licensors new rights in terminating license agreements when
licensees sue and refuse to pay royalties.
The Federal Circuit began its rebuke of lower court cases such as Crane
Co. v. Aeroquip Corp.23' and Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Moraine
Products232 with C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz.233 In that case, licensor
Schwartz granted Bard an exclusive license to make, use, and sell a catheter
assembly in exchange for royalties. The license agreement provided that "[i]n
the event BARD asserts invalidity of any of the said Patents within the scope
of this Agreement and refuses to pay royalties on account of such asserted
invalidity, then GRANTOR may terminate this Agreement as to the Patent or
Patents as to which invalidity is asserted. 2 34 Bard ceased paying royalties
227. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
228. See supra note 202.
229. Hemstreet, 851 F.2d at 350.
230. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
231. Crane, 356 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Ill. 1973), modified on other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.
1974); see supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text.
232. Atlas, 509 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1974); see supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
233. Bard, 716 F.2d 874, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
234. Id. at 881 n.5.
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and Schwartz filed suit in state court to retrieve these royalties. 235 In
addition, Schwartz alleged that licensee Bard had committed fraud, in that
Bard had never intended to make, use, or sell the assembly, but instead
entered into the exclusive license purely as a means to limit competition in
the catheter market in order to promote its own products. 236 Bard responded
by filing a validity suit in federal district court, asking that court to declare
the license agreement unenforceable under Lear, and demanding that all
royalties it had already paid be returned. Schwartz countered that because
neither it nor Bard terminated the agreement, the court should estop Bard
from bringing a validity challenge while the license was still in existence.237
The Federal Circuit held that because Bard "had a reasonable apprehension
of an infringement suit [by Schwartz]," Bard could bring the validity action
without terminating the license.238 In doing so the court reasoned that
"always" requiring termination of licenses before licensees could bring
validity challenges would be "contrary to the policies expressed in Lear."'239
Though the court affirmed the importance of the Lear policies, this holding
was still more favorable to the licensor than were many of the regional circuit
treatments. As discussed earlier in this Note, many regional circuits and
district courts would have reached this result in every case.240 In Bard,
however, the Federal Circuit explicitly limited its holding to "the facts of this
case ... in the totality of the circumstances, '24' which were that the
licensee had stopped paying royalties, creating a breach of contract which
enabled licensor Schwartz to terminate the license "under the very terms of
the agreement. 242
This breach, the court reasoned, gave the licensor the power to sue for
infringement, in 'turn giving licensee Bard a reasonable apprehension of
suit. 243 The finding that the licensee had breached the agreement itself
virtually acknowledges the validity of no-challenge termination clauses. By
ruling that the provision was enforceable, the Federal Circuit effectively held
that license provisions which give licensors the right to terminate licenses are
enforceable when licensees bring validity challenges and cease making royalty
payments. The only difference between a no-challenge clause and the Bard
provision is that in the latter the licensee must also stop paying royalties
before a licensor may terminate the license.
235. Id. at 875.
236. Id. Schwartz also charged that Bard failed to use its best efforts, as the contract required, to
promote and sell the invention, that it breached its fiduciary obligation under the license by not
promoting the invention, and by not disclosing its intentions not to promote it, that it did not report and
pay royalties on an embodiment of the invention, and that Bard's purported sublicense with another
company was an assignment under which no royalties were paid. Id. at 875-76.
237. Id. at 879-81.
238. Id. at 880.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.
241. Bard, 716 F.2d at 880.
242. Id. at 881.
243. Id. at 880-81.
1993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The Federal Circuit ventured a step further in Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic,
Inc. 244 In Cordis, the court held that the licensors could terminate the
agreement when the licensee ceases making royalty payments, even without
a license provision enabling the licensor to do so.245 Additionally, the
Cordis court departed from the regional circuits by barring licensees from
depositing royalties in escrow during litigation.24 6 The Federal Circuit spoke
very broadly and made it very clear that Lear is limited by policies beyond
res judicata principles which were present in consent decrees and settlement
agreements:
This [Lear] policy statement does permit a licensee to cease payments due
under a contract while challenging the validity of a patent. It does not
permit the licensees to avoid facing the consequences that such an action
would bring. The holding of Lear only prevents the affirmative enforce-
ment by the licensor of the royalty payment provisions of the license
agreement while the patent's validity is being challenged by the licensee.
[I]f [the licensees] wish to continue to invoke the protections of their
licensing agreements, they should be required to continue paying their
royalties to the [licensor] .... It would not be fair for the plaintiffs to be
allowed simultaneously to reap all the benefits of the licensing agreement
and to deprive the licensor of all his royalties. Patents are presumed
valid.... [U]ntil invalidity is proven, the patentee should ordinarily be
permitted to enjoy the fruits of his invention. The principal effect of an
escrow arrangement would be to put undeserved pressure on the [licen-
sor]. 247
This language represents a departure from Lear and its progeny's view of
licensing arrangements: where the latter viewed patents as mere "legal
conclusion[s] ... predicated on factors as to which reasonable men can differ
widely, ' 248 the Federal Circuit emphasizes that patents are "presumed valid"
and must yield benefits to licensors until "proven invalid"; while the Lear
progeny voided devices that had a "chilling effect" on validity challenges,249
the Cordis court says that Lear only prevented affirmative enforcement of
royalty payments and that licensees must "fac[e] the consequences" of validity
suits; and while Lear found that "the equities of the licensor do not weigh
very heavily,"25 the Federal Circuit emphasizes "fair[ness]" to licensors.
The Federal Circuit's attitude favoring licensors who may face validity
challenges strengthens the case for enforcing no-challenge termination
provisions. If licensors can terminate licenses, even absent license provisions
for doing so, when licensees cease paying royalties and bring validity suits so
that the licensor may bring an infringement suit against the licensee, there is
244. Cordis, 780 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
245. Id. at 995.
246. Id. at 994.
247. Id. at 995 (first emphasis in original) (second emphasis added).
248. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
249. Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 356 F. Supp. 733, 738 (N.D. Ill. 1973), modified on other
grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
250. Lear, 395 U.S. at 670; see supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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no reason why parties should not be able to negotiate for license provisions
that allow a licensor to terminate the license when a licensee sues for
invalidity but simultaneously wants to continue the license in case it loses the
suit. The Federal Circuit would likely rule, under Cordis, that Lear "does not
permit ... licensee[s] to avoid facing the consequences that such an action
would bring."25' Given the trend of the Federal Circuit, such a holding
would be the next logical step towards achieving proper risk allocation
between licensors and licensees.
C. Other Federal Circuit Holdings and Dicta That Strengthen the
Enforceability of No-Challenge Termination Clauses
Not only has the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals supported the enforce-
ability of no-challenge termination clauses by demonstrating that Lear has
limits and can be subordinate to countervailing policies, some Federal Circuit
judges have espoused the policies of innovation and contractual freedom in
limiting or attacking the Lear rationale. These are the very policies that no-
challenge termination clauses promote.252
One such example is Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc.253 In
Diamond, the Federal Circuit protected licensors by holding that an inventor
who assigned the rights to another (likely to become a licensor since it owns
the patent) is estopped from challenging the validity of the patent.254 This
doctrine is known as "assignor estoppel" and was thought to be invalid under
Lear and under the cases that Lear relied upon.255 The court gave little or
no weight to the Lear policy of preventing "the public [from] continually
be[ing] required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification," by encouraging validity challenges.256 Instead, the Federal
Circuit attempted to distinguish Lear, stating that the policy of "allowing a
licensee" to challenge validity was not present, for the challenger was an
assignor, not a licensee. This logic fails, however, because an assignor's
validity challenge contributes just as much to the policy of "full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public
domain '257 as a licensee validity challenge does. Evidently, the court de-
emphasized the Lear policy in order to protect patent owners, for in this case
there was no major countervailing policy, such as res judicata, which could
be so significant as to limit Lear.
Perhaps even more importantly, this de-emphasis of Lear policies opened
the door for concurring Judge Newman to attack the policy of Lear as
251. Cordis, 780 F.2d at 995.
252. See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
253. Diamond, 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 (1988).
254. Id. at 1224-45.
255. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945) (holding that the assignor was not
estopped from denying the validity of the patent where the assignee sued the assignor for infringement);
Lear, 395 U.S. at 666.




"outmoded theory" which "disserves the national interest" of encouraging
innovation:
Much attention has been given to encouraging investment in research and
commercialization of new products, and in providing incentives to offset
the risk inherent in. . .. strengthening incentives for innovation[.] I believe
that both public policy and experience weigh on the side of reaffirming the
contractual integrity of patent assignments.
... The Court in Lear apparently believed that "full and free competition"
ensues when a patent is eliminated from the rolls. The experience of the
marketplace is otherwise. The usual incentive to the patent licensee in taking
the license is, and always has been, the opportunity for profit. If the
destruction of a licensed patent would ... facilitate the entry of competitors,
this would surely be weighed by a licensee before ... a ... challenge to the
licensed patent.
... Patent right$ are indeed vested with strong elements of public interest,
but this does not exclude giving due weight to all the interests involved....
I would decline to give sustenance to a theory of public policy that both
weakens the rule of law and disserves the national interest.
258
Thus, it appears that in Diamond, at least one Federal Circuit judge was
prepared to abandon Lear altogether in order to promote national innovation
policy and the others were willing to limit the celebrated policy of Lear
without even mentioning countervailing policies.
59
The Federal Circuit limited Lear two more times in the year after
Diamond, but this time the court stressed the goal of contractual freedom in
patent transactions. First, in Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equipment Leasing,
Inc.2 60 the Federal Circuit held that Lear does not bar enforcement of a
contractual promise of a non-licensee to not challenge the validity of a patent
where the contract encouraged "development of technology and invention."
The court stated that such provisions must be considered under state contract
law in order to preserve "the integrity of contracts" and foster commercial
relationships leading to innovation. 61
Then, in RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 62 a licensor asked the court
to interpret Lear as mandating that any failure of licensees to pay royalties
during suit is a breach of contract. The Circuit found that such failure to pay
royalties could constitute a breach, but such an issue is a matter of state law,
not federal law. In doing so, the court elaborated that "Lear does not in fact
discuss a licensor's right to royalties .... Nor does it deal with a licensor's
right to terminate or rescind a license agreement .... Those questions
258. Diamond, 848 F.2d at 1227-28 (Newman, J., concurring).
259. The court's justification for reviving assignor estoppel was grounded in "prevent[ing] unfairness
and injustice." Id. at 1224.
260. Sun Studs, 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
261. Id. at 992.
262. RCA, 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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continue to be matters dependent on particular fact situations, contract
provisions, and state contract law."
263
Diamond, Sun Studs, and RCA each reveal that the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals is willing to sidestep Lear for the sake of promoting the national
interest in innovation through efficient contractual negotiations. Such a
willingness gives no-challenge termination clauses a very good chance of
being upheld if they are ever before the Federal Circuit.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, licensing attorneys are reluctant to use no-challenge
termination clauses in licensing agreements because Lear and its progeny of
cases placed the legality of such clauses in jeopardy by striking down the
doctrine of "licensee estoppel," no-challenge clauses in contracts and in
settlement agreements, consent decrees, and royalty and termination provisions
that shifted leverage to licensors. This case law not only threatened the
enforceability of no-challenge termination clauses, but also excessively shifted
risk onto the licensor, discouraging the important economic tool of innovation.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this trend by
overruling much of the Lear progeny of cases. Some Federal Circuit cases
went so far as to allow licensors to terminate licenses when the licensee sued
for patent invalidity and ceased making royalty payments. Other cases indicate
that Lear itself was not a well-reasoned case. The Federal Circuit, however,
repeatedly endorsed the narrow holding of Lear, leaving the enforceability of
no-challenge termination clauses questionable.
The United States Constitution gave Congress the power to promote the
"useful arts," and Congress utilized this power by creating the federal patent
laws. As the Framers predicted, innovation has been a key to the economic
growth of this country. Now, however, it is critically important, for foreign
companies who have become more efficient at producing new technologies are
threatening the huge competitive advantage that the United States built during
the 1940's and 50's. To stay competitive, America must structure itself in
such a way as to encourage innovation.
Modern licensing laws should be oriented toward this goal of encouraging
innovation, for licensing is in itself an efficient way to produce, distribute,
and promote new technologies. Enforcing no-challenge termination clauses is
a way for patent law to serve its constitutional purpose without producing
undue societal costs. Under such a provision, a potential patentee would be
more likely to innovate, file a patent application, then license the invention,
since it would encounter minimal litigation risks. At the same time, licensees
would still be free to challenge the validity of patents, supporting the Lear
policy of ridding society of invalid patents. Enforcing no-challenge termina-
tion clauses would make the efficient tool of licensing even more efficient,
263. Id. at 1064.
1993)
and would be a feasible step towards adjusting the legal system to maximize
American economic strength.
